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A GALOIS CONNECTION BETWEEN INTUITIONISTIC AND
CLASSICAL LOGICS. I: SYNTAX
SERGEY A. MELIKHOV
Abstract. In a 1985 commentary to his collected works [38], Kolmogorov remarked
that his 1932 paper [36] “was written in hope that with time, the logic of solution of
problems [i.e., intuitionistic logic] will become a permanent part of a [standard] course
of logic. A unified logical apparatus was intended to be created, which would deal with
objects of two types — propositions and problems.” We construct such a formal system
QHC, which is a conservative extension of both the intuitionistic predicate calculus QH
and the classical predicate calculus QC.
The only new connectives ? and ! of QHC induce a Galois connection between the
Lindenbaum posets (i.e. the underlying posets of the Lindenbaum algebras) of QH and
QC. Kolmogorov’s double negation translation of propositions into problems extends
to a retraction of QHC onto QH; whereas Go¨del’s provability translation of problems
into modal propositions extends to a retraction of QHC onto its QC+(?!) fragment,
identified with the modal logic QS4. The QH+(!?) fragment is an intuitionistic modal
logic — whose modality !? is a strict lax modality in the sense of Aczel — and thus
resembles the squash/bracket operation in intuitionistic type theories.
The axioms of QHC attempt to give a fuller formalization (with respect to the axioms
of intuitionistic logic) to the two best known contentual interpretations of intiuitionistic
logic: Kolmogorov’s problem interpretation (incorporating standard refinements by
Heyting and Kreisel) and the proof interpretation by Orlov and Heyting (as clarified
by Go¨del). While these two interpretations are often conflated, from the viewpoint of
the axioms of QHC neither of them reduces to the other one, although they do overlap.
1. Introduction
1.1. Problems versus propositions
The present series of papers (the sequels being [2] and [3]) belongs firmly to the field
of Logic, but is motivated primarily by considerations of mathematical practice rather
than any internal developments in the field of Logic. Therefore it is addressed not only
to logicians, but to other mathematicians as well. The reader who is not familiar with
any of the terms used can consult the treatise [1] as need arises; one of its main goals is
precisely to make the present series accessible to a general mathematical audience.
1Galois connection is a standard notion of order theory, whose eponymous example is the correspondence
between the poset of fixed fields and the poset of subgroups in Galois theory. It can be defined as a
pair of adjoint functors between two posets, regarded as categories. See [25; pp. 166–167] for a concise
introduction to Galois connections, and [16] for further details.
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This paper introduces a logical apparatus that enables one to study in a formal setting
basic interdependencies between what can be called (cf. §6.1) two modes of knowledge:
knowledge-that (or knowledge of truths) and knowledge-how (or knowledge of methods).
In mathematical practice, these have been traditionally represented by propositions (i.e.,
assertions, such as theorems and conjectures) and problems (such as geometric construc-
tion problems and initial value problems). The English word “problem” is, in fact,
somewhat imprecise; we will use it in the narrow sense of a request (or desire) to find
a construction meeting specified criteria on output and permitted means (as in “chess
problem”). This meaning is less ambiguously captured by the German Aufgabe (as op-
posed to the German Problem) and the Russian задача (as opposed to проблема). The
closest English word is task (other words with related meanings include assignment, ex-
ercise, challenge, aim, mission), but as it is not normally used in mathematical contexts,
we prefer to speak of problems.
To appreciate the difference between problems and propositions, let us note firstly
that the problem requesting to find a proof of a proposition P is closely related to both
(i) the proposition asserting that P is true; and (ii) the proposition asserting that P is
provable. These are not the same, of course, whenever “proofs” are taken to be in some
formal theory T and “truth” is taken according to some two-valued model M of T , with
respect to which T is not complete.1 There are other reasons why “true” should not
be equated with “provable”; for instance, they differ also in the modal logic S4, where
it is a simple consequence of the axioms that consistency is provable.2 Conversely, the
proposition asserting that two groups G and H are isomorphic is closely related to both
(i) the problem requesting to prove that G and H are isomorphic; and (ii) the problem
requesting to construct an isomorphism between G and H . These are generally not
the same because one proof that an isomorphism exists might represent several distinct
isomorphisms or no specific isomorphism.
The logical distinction between problems and theorems (as they appear, in particular,
in Euclid’s Elements) has been articulated at length by a number of ancient Greek
geometers in response to others who disputed it. A detailed review of what the ancients
had to say on this matter is included in the third part of this paper [3]. In modern times,
the distinction was emphasized by Kolmogorov [36]:
1For instance, T could consist of the axioms of planar geometry except for the axiom of parallel lines,
and M could be the Euclidean planar geometry. One could object that it would be fair to compare
truth according to Euclidean geometry with proofs in its complete theory; but then T could be Peano
Arithmetic or ZFC, which by Go¨del’s theorem are not complete with respect to any models. (See
[1; §3.6] for a more detailed discussion.)
2With respect to the internal notion of provability. As shown by Arte¨mov [7], the latter can be mod-
elled by the existence of proofs in Peano Arithmetic, where “proofs” have the usual meaning of formal
proofs (except that Arte¨mov needs one “proof” to be able to prove several formulas), but “existence” is
understood in an explicit sense, not expressible internally in Peano Arithmetic.
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“On a par with theoretical logic, which systematizes schemes of proofs of theoretical
truths, one can systematize schemes of solutions of problems — for example, of geometric
construction problems. For instance, similarly to the principle of syllogism we have the
following principle here: If we can reduce solving b to solving a, and solving c to solving
b, then we can also reduce solving c to solving a.
Upon introducing appropriate notation, one can specify the rules of a formal calculus
that yield a symbolic construction of a system of such problem solving schemes. Thus,
in addition to theoretical logic, a certain new calculus of problems arises. In this setting
there is no need for any special, e.g. intuitionistic, epistemic presuppositions.
The following striking fact holds: The calculus of problems coincides in form with
Brouwer’s intuitionistic logic, as recently formalized by Mr. Heyting.
In the second section we undertake a critical analysis of intuitionistic logic, accepting gen-
eral intuitionistic presuppositions; and observe that intuitionistic logic should be replaced
with the calculus of problems, since its objects are in reality not theoretical propositions
but rather problems.”
A key difference between problems and propositions is that the notion of truth for
propositions has no direct analogue for problems, so that problems cannot be asserted.
For instance, let Γ be the problem Divide any given angle into three equal parts with
compass and (unmarked) ruler. Then Γ ∨ ¬Γ reads, Divide any given angle into three
equal parts with compass and ruler or prove that it is impossible to do so (cf. [1; §3.8] and
3.10 below). This is not a trivial problem; indeed, its solution took a couple of millennia.
Even now that a solution is well-known, the problem still makes perfect sense: the law
of excluded middle would not help a student to solve this problem on an exam (in Galois
theory). By citing the law of excluded middle she could solve another problem: Prove
that either Γ has a solution or Γ has no solutions; in symbols,
!(?Γ ∨ ¬?Γ),
where ?Γ denotes the proposition There exists a solution of the problem Γ, and !P denotes
the problem Prove the proposition P .3 In fact, this problem is strictly easier than
!?Γ ∨ !¬?Γ
(in words, Prove or disprove that Γ has a solution), which requires a justified explicit
choice. But the latter problem, which can be written equivalently as !?Γ ∨ ¬Γ, is still
strictly easier than the original problem, Γ ∨ ¬Γ, for it is generally easier to prove that
some problem has a solution than to actually solve it.
1.2. A joint logic
The present paper is devoted to the study of the logical operators ? and ! in a formal set-
ting. Like in the previous example, ! is meant to refer to non-constructive proofs, whereas
3Let us explain the notation. A proposition comes with a question whether it is true or false; whereas
a problem comes with an urge to solve it. Thus ? can serve as a concise typing symbol for propositions,
and ! for problems. By placing a typing symbol in front of a sentence we indicate its conversion into
the corresponding type.
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? is understood to signify explicit existence. We extract axioms and rules governing the
use of ? and ! essentially from two sources:
• The problem interpretation of intuitionistic logic. This is essentially Kolmogorov’s
1932 explanation of the intuitionistic connectives [36], which had some parallels
with the independent writings of Heyting (1931), and was slightly refined by
Heyting (1934). A disguised form of this explanation, often incorporating a fur-
ther refinement by Kreisel, has come to be known as the BHK interpretation of
intuitionistic logic (see [1; §3] for a detailed review and discussion). We include
Kreisel’s addendum in the following form, also found in the ancient commen-
tary by Proclus on Euclid’s Elements (see [3]): A solution of a problem must
include not only a construction, but also the verification, i.e. a proof that the
construction meets the requirements specified in the problem (see [1; §3.8] for a
discussion of this principle).
• The proof interpretation of intuitionistic logic. This is essentially the meaning
explanation of intuitionistic logic given independently by Orlov (1928) and Heyt-
ing (1930, 31) (see a detailed review in §6.2.1), which was partially formalized
in Go¨del’s 1933 translation of problems into modal propositions (see [1; §5.7.3]),
and further clarified by Go¨del’s proof-relevant analogue of S4 (see §2.4.2).4
It then comes as a little surprise that the resulting axioms and rules harbor a great deal
of unintended symmetries, and are also compatible with Kolmogorov’s double negation
translation of propositions into problems (reviewed briefly in [1; §5.6]). (For a different
connection between Kolmogorov’s and Go¨del’s translations see [14].) What is most
surprising, however, is that nobody seems to have studied the operators ? and ! before,
apart from hints of an abandoned project aimed at a similar study, found in Kolmogorov’s
own writings. In his 1931 letter to Heyting [37], Kolmogorov wrote:
Each ‘proposition’ in your framework belongs, in my view, to one of two sorts:
(α) p expresses hope that in prescribed circumstances, a certain experiment will
always produce a specified result. (For example, that an attempt to represent
an even number n as a sum of two primes will succeed upon exhausting all pairs
(p, q), p < n, q < n.5) Of course, every “experiment” must be realizable by a
finite number of deterministic operations.
(β) p expresses intention to find a certain construction.
[...] I prefer to keep the name proposition (Aussage) only for propositions of type (α) and
to call “propositions” of type (β) simply problems (Aufgaben). Associated to a proposition
p are the problems ∼ p (to derive contradiction from p) and + p (to prove p).
4The fact that the Orlov–Heyting–Go¨del proof interpretation is substantially different from the
Kolmogorov–Heyting–Kreisel problem interpretation seems to have been never properly recognized,
except that Go¨del’s paper formalizing the Orlov–Heyting interpretation begins with a reference to
Kolmogorov’s “somewhat different interpretation ... [given] without, to be sure, specifying a precise
formalism” [22] (see also [45; p. 235]). A certain precise formalism attempting to capture Kolmogorov’s
interpretation alone is specified in [1; §5.1].
5This p (prime number) is unrelated to the previous p (proposition).
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Apart from this fragment and the quote in the abstract, there are only a few further
hints at how Kolmogorov envisaged the connection between problems and propositions.
Several problems consisting in proving a proposition are also mentioned in Kolmogorov’s
paper [36]. There is also a bit more in Kolmogorov’s letters to Heyting, which will be
thoroughly reviewed in §6.2.2. There we note, in particular, that while Kolmogorov’s
propositions of type (β) seem to stand precisely for the objects of intuitionistic logic, his
propositions of type (α) could not be intended to exhaust all objects of classical logic; in
fact, it appears that they can be identified with the “stable propositions” of §4. Another
apparent divergence between Kolmogorov’s remarks and our approach is noted in 3.10
and discussed more thoroughly in [1; §3.8].
The joint logic of problems and propositions that is constructed in the present paper
is presumably very unnatural in the standard constructivist paradigm (of Brouwer and
Heyting) that views intuitionistic logic as an alternative to classical logic that criminal-
izes some of its principles. We work in the other paradigm (of Kolmogorov), which views
intuitionistic logic as an extension package that upgrades classical logic without removing
it. For us, the main purpose of this upgrade is solution-relevance (=“proof-relevance”), or
“categorification”. Thus from the viewpoint of the BHK semantics, topological (Tarski)
models are in fact models of a “squashed” copy of intuitionistic logic — whose existence is
only revealed with the aid of the new connectives ! and ? (see §5.2 below); whereas “true”
models of the genuine intuitionistic logic are the (solution-relevant) sheaf-valued models
of [1] (a special case of “categorical models” — not to be confused with the usual “sheaf
models” of intuitionistic logic). Models of the joint logic of problems and propositions
will be discussed in [3].
1.3. Double negation translation
Speaking of “intuitionistic logic as an extension package that upgrades classical logic
without removing it”, we run into the natural question: “Wait, but what about the double
negation translation?” Indeed, there is a version of the double negation translation that
redefines classical connectives in terms of intuitionistic ones and introduces no other
modifications to formulas (see [1; §5.6]). However, this syntactic translation fails to
reflect actual mathematical practice. There are several levels at which this failure occurs:
(i) In the words of Kreisel [39], “there is a good reason why mathematicians neglect”
the double negation translation, in the form of “replacing ∃ by ¬∀¬ and p∨ q by ¬(¬p∨
¬q)”, “namely, this: For the sense in which mathematicians actually understand the
propositions of mathematical practice, ... the difference between ∃ and ∨ on the one
hand and their translations on the other ... is not significant”. “Put differently, they do
not understand the intuitionistic meaning of ∀ and ¬ which makes the [double negation]
translation significant.”
This is not merely a matter of mathematicians’ conventions, psychology or ignorance.
For mathematicians to be serious about the intuitionistic meaning of propositions, in the
tradition of Brouwer and Heyting, they would have to sacrifice their understanding of
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mathematical objects as ideal entities existing independently of one’s knowledge about
them. But most of them certainly do not want to be “expelled from the paradise that
Cantor has created”, and for a good reason: the customary mental aid of Platonism does
simplify their job immensely.
(ii) Kolmogorov’s problem interpretation of intuitionistic logic entirely avoids the issue
of sacrificing platonist thinking. But then the double negation translation makes no
sense, because, when understood in these terms, it conflates problems with propositions;
and when corrected so as to respect their distinction, it is no longer a translation into
plain intuitionistic logic. This “corrected” double negation translation (see §5.4) is,
actually, quite meaningful from the viewpoint of mathematical practice; for instance,
∃xP (x), “there exists an x such that P (x)” is translated as ¬?¬∃x !P (x), “it is impossible
to derive a contradiction from a construction of x along with a proof of P (x)”. The
“corrected” double negation translation is essentially equivalent to Fitting’s translation
of classical logic into the modal logic QS4.
(iii) Even though the “corrected” double negation translation is no longer a translation
into plain intuitionistic logic, one might still ask if its effect is significant from the
viewpoint of mathematical practice. The assertion that its effect is trivial is equivalent
(see [2; 3.20]) to the so-called K-principle, ¬!P → !¬P , an independent principle of the
joint logic of problems and propositions. But the effect of the K-principle is drastic: it
immediately rules out independent statements (see [1; §3.8.3] and [2; §3.1]).
1.4. Related work
Modern literature contains a number of attempts to blend classical and intuitionistic
logics. On the one hand, there are the Linear Logic and the logics of Japaridze [31], [32],
[33], [34] and Liang–Miller [40], [41], which all have something classical and something
intuitionistic in them — albeit fused in far more elaborate ways than Kolmogorov could
have possibly meant in his words: “A unified logical apparatus was intended to be
created, which would deal with objects of two types — propositions and problems” [38].6
On the other hand, there is Arte¨mov’s Logic of Proofs LP, which he actually meant to
address these very words of Kolmogorov [7; p. 2]. It is clear, however, from Kolmogorov’s
letter quoted above, that he did envisage the “two types” to be on equal footing, which
is not the case in Arte¨mov’s LP. Also, for instance, the following expression found
in Kolmogorov’s paper [36]: “in the case where the problem a consists in proving a
proposition” does not seem to be compatible with Arte¨mov’s approach. In a future paper
the author plans to discuss a proof-relevant extension of the joint logic of problems and
propositions which includes a variation of Arte¨mov’s LP.
What is more obviously related to Kolmogorov’s research program is the “propositions-
as-some-types” paradigm, and indeed our composite operator !? on problems is very
6This is a literal translation; the meaning of “Предполагалось создание ...” is inherently ambiguous,
and could well be either “I intended to create ...” or “We intended to create with my colleagues ...” or
“I intended a student to create ...”.
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similar to the squash/bracket operator in intuitionistic type theories (see §3 and 3.18).
There are also similarities between our approach and some ideas behind the Calculus of
Constructions [13] (see also [5] and [11]).
A direct type-theoretic analogue of our ? due to Aczel and Gambino [5; §1.3] is dis-
similar to ? in that it satisfies a reversible analogue of our schema (?
→
) (see §2.4). In
contrast, the reversibility of our (?
→
) would amount to allowing the BHK interpretation
to represent arbitrary, and not just constructive functions (see [1; §3.9]). But there
is nothing surprising here, since Aczel and Gambino do not assume the principle of
excluded middle on either the two sides.
A type-theoretic analogue of our ! due to Coquand [13; §1] satisfies an analogue of
our schema (!∀) (see §3.6), which Coquand argues to express “Heyting’s semantics of the
universal quantification”. This time we see a full agreement on the syntactic level; but it
is remarkable that our formalization of the BHK clause for the universal quantification
is not (!∀), which is reversible just like its Coquand’s version, but (?∀) (see §2.4), which
is irreversible for the same reasons as (?
→
).
Disclaimer
Most translations quoted in the present series of papers have been edited by the present
author in order to improve syntactic and semantic fidelity. When emphasis is present in
quoted text, it is always original.
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2. QHC calculus
In the present series of papers we work in first-order logic, but with some deviations
from standard terminology, notation and conventions. Namely, our basic syntactic setup
is the meta-logic of [1; §4], which is a slightly simplified and “mathematicized” version
of the meta-logic used in the Isabelle proof-checker. The simplification is mostly
concerned with omission of features that are not needed for dealing with first-order
logics (without equality). To be precise, in the present series of papers we use the
straightforward extension of the setup in [1; §4] to the case of many-sorted first-order
logics.
The following includes a quick summary of [1; §4] which should suffice for the reader
who is familiar with some conventional treatments of first-order logic as well as simply-
typed λ-calculus and natural deduction.
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2.1. Simply-typed λ-calculus
The language in which our logic and its meta-logic are formulated is the simply-typed
λ-calculus with (binary) products, with [1] and the present series of papers taking the
following deviations from standard terminology, notation and conventions.
• The word “term” is used in the sense of first order logic, and consequently we
speak of λ-expressions rather than λ-terms. The word “arity” is used is the tra-
ditional sense (of logic and mathematics), and consequently we speak of types
(rather than arities) of λ-expressions. The word “closed” (as e.g. in “closed for-
mula”) is used in the sense of first-order logic, so we refer to λ-expressions that
are closed in the sense of λ-calculus as λ-closed ones.
• Abstraction is written in the style of mathematics, as x 7→ T , and not in the style
of logic and computer science, λx.T . Function application is normally written as
F (T ) and only in some cases abbreviated as FT . The function type is denoted
Γ→ ∆; no associativity conventions for → and 7→ are assumed.
• We omit brackets in iterated products using standard isomorphisms, and use
tuples (T1, . . . , Tn), also written ~T , which are defined recursively in terms of
pairs. Projection on the ith factor of a product is denoted pi. We also use
multivariable abstraction x1, . . . , xn 7→ T , which is defined recursively in terms
of abstraction and tuples (not just up to α-equivalence; see [1; §4.2.4]).
• Substitution is denoted S|x:=T and is undefined whenever some variable is cap-
tured. The same goes for the simultaneous substitution S|~x:=~T . A λ-expression
of the form (~x 7→ S)(~T ) may βη-reduce beyond S|~x:=~T ; if such a βη-reduction
involves no α-conversions, and its result is in βη-normal form, then this resulting
λ-expression is denoted S[~x/~T ], and the tuple ~T is called free for ~x in S (see
[1; §4.2.5]).
• The variables of a type Γ are denoted xΓ
1
, xΓ
2
, . . . . We generally use lowercase
letters to write metavariables for variables and constants, and uppercase letters
to write metavariables for arbitrary terms.
2.2. Language of QHC
QHC is a two-sorted first-order logic without equality. To describe its language, we need
three basic types:
• 0, the type of terms;
• 1i, the type of i-formulas (“i” stands for “intuitionistic”);
• 1c, the type of c-formulas (“c” stands for “classical”).
The language of QHC consists of the following sets of typed λ-expressions (variables
and constants only), where n ranges over N = {0, 1, 2, . . . }:
(1) the set of variables of type 0, called individual variables;
(2n) the set of variables of type 0
n
→ 1c, called n-ary predicate variables;
(3n) the set of variables of type 0
n
→ 1i, called n-ary problem variables.
A GALOIS CONNECTION BETWEEN INTUITIONISTIC & CLASSICAL LOGICS. I: SYNTAX 9
Each of the sets (1), (2n), (3n) is a countably infinite set. Nullary predicate variables
are also called propositional variables. For reasons of readability we will also use the
alternative spelling a, b, c, . . . , x, y, z for the first 26 individual variables x0
1
, . . . , x0
26
, re-
serving an upright sans-serif font for this purpose. Similarly, we use the abbreviations
a,b, c, . . . , x,y, z for the first 26 predicate variables of each arity and α,β,γ, . . . ,χ,ψ,ω
for the first 24 problem variables of each arity, reserving a fancy (Euler) upright serif
font for this purpose.
In using predicate and problem variables we follow the tradition of classic texts in
first-order logic such as those by Hilbert–Ackermann, Hilbert–Bernays, Church and P. S.
Novikov, who did include predicate variables in addition to predicate constants. Modern
treatments of first-order logic usually do not include predicate variables in the language,
and are content with predicate constants (even though they include propositional vari-
ables in the language of propositional logic). In fact, it is clear that the language of a
logic in reality contains only predicate variables, whereas predicate constants are chosen
differently for each theory over the logic, and so actually belong to the language of a
theory and not to the language of the logic.
The sets (1)–(3n) are common to any two-sorted first-order logic. Specific to QHC are
the following constants. Connectives:
(4) truth and falsity ⊤,⊥ : 1c;
(5) classical negation ¬ : 1c → 1c;
(6) classical binary connectives ∧,∨,→,↔: 1c × 1c → 1c;
(7) triviality and absurdity X,× : 1i;
(8) intuitionistic negation ¬ : 1i → 1i;
(9) intuitionistic binary connectives ∧,∨,→,↔: 1i × 1i → 1i,
quantifiers:
(10) classical quantifiers ∀, ∃ : (0→ 1c) → 1c;
(11) intuitionistic quantifiers ∀, ∃ : (0→ 1i) → 1i,
and conversion operators:
(12) ! : 1c → 1i;
(13) ? : 1i → 1c.
Some of the connectives and quantifiers are “syntactic sugar”, i.e. they should not really
be on the above list as they are definable in terms of others. Namely, the intuitionistic
↔, ¬ and X are definable in terms of the intuitionistic ∧,∨,→ and ×; and the classical
↔, ∧, ∨, ¬ and ⊤ are definable in terms of the classical → and ⊥, and the classical ∃
is definable in terms of the classical ∀, → and ⊥. However it is convenient to regard all
these symbols (4)–(11), including the redundant ones, as “connectives” and “quantifiers”.
It should be noted that we do not differentiate graphically between classical connec-
tives/quantifiers and intuitionistic ones, since they can be distinguished by the type of
the λ-expressions that they act upon (1c or 1i) — except for the nullary connectives,
which we do take care to differentiate (classical: ⊤,⊥; intuitionistic: X,×). This is
based on the observation that lowercase Greek letters, which we use to denote problem
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variables, are visually distinct from lowercase Roman letters, which we use to denote
predicate variables. Note, however, the difference between → (classical or intuitionistic
implication) and → (function type).
If q is a quantifier, A is a λ-expression of type 1c or 1i, and x is an individual variable,
then qxA abbreviates the λ-expression q(x 7→ A). More generally, q~xA abbreviates
q(~x 7→ A). Due to this abbreviation, λ-abstraction is only implicit in formulas.
Remark 2.1. In the preceding paragraph, A is a metavariable that stands for an arbitrary
unknown λ-expression of type 1c or 1i. Accordingly, the symbol “A” can be read in two
ways: as the first Roman uppercase letter or as the first Greek uppercase letter. We
will use uppercase letters that are unambiguously Greek (from the viewpoint of TEX) to
write metavariables that stand unambiguously for a λ-expression of type 1i, and those
unambiguously Roman for λ-expressions of type 1c.
This completes the description of the pure language of QHC. However, the language
ℒ of a theory over QHC (such as the plane geometry of [3]) may additionally contain
the following sets:
(14n) a finite set of constants of type 0
n
→ 0, called n-ary function symbols;
(15n) a finite set of constants of type 0
n
→ 1c, called n-ary predicate constants;
(16n) a finite set of constants of type 0
n
→ 1i, called n-ary problem constants.
It should be noted that nullary predicate and problem constants are the same kind of
λ-expressions as nullary connectives (i.e., constants of types 1c and 1i). It is nevertheless
convenient to distinguish them, since the latter belong to the pure language of QHC but
the former do not.
Terms of the language ℒ are defined inductively, as built out of individual variables
using the function symbols. Thus not every λ-expression of type 0 is a term (for example,
no term involves λ-abstraction). An atomic c-formula of ℒ is a λ-expression of type 1c
obtained by applying either an n-ary predicate constant or an n-ary predicate variable
to an n-tuple of terms; an atomic i-formula is a λ-expression of type 1i obtained by
applying either an n-ary problem constant or an n-ary problem variable to an n-tuple of
terms. A formula of ℒ is a λ-expression built out of atomic c-formulas and i-formulas
using the connectives, quantifiers and conversion operators.
A formula of type 1c is called a c-formula and a formula of type 1i is called an i-
formula. (Clearly, every formula is either a c-formula or an i-formula.)
A purely classical formula is a λ-expression of type 1c built out of atomic c-formulas
using classical connectives and classical quantifiers only; a purely intuitionistic formula
is a λ-expression of type 1i built out of atomic i-formulas using intuitionistic connectives
and intuitionistic quantifiers only.
A λ-expression of the form x1, . . . , xn 7→ F , where F is a formula and x1, . . . , xn are
pairwise distinct individual variables, is called an n-formula. It can also be called an
n-c-formula or an n-i-formula if F is a c-formula or an i-formula.
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2.3. Meta-logic
2.3.1. Introduction. Any kind of literature on first-order logic constantly deals with
meta-logical concepts and assertions, but usually only implicitly. Why would one want
to make them explicit, and discuss a first-order logic in terms of a formal meta-logic?
One reason is that a pedantic verbalist, who ignores the implicit, must perceive the
hidden meta-logic as an ever-present conflation and ambiguity. Here are two examples.
Example 2.2. The literature on first-order classical and intuitionistic logics is accus-
tomed to speaking of “the syntactic consequence”; but the syntactic consequence in the
sense of e.g. the textbooks by Schoefield and Mendelson is inequivalent to the syntac-
tic consequence in the sense of e.g. the textbooks by Church, Enderton, Kolmogorov–
Dragalin, Troelstra and van Dalen. Moreover, Kleene and Avron have considered the two
notions simultaneously, as well as the corresponding notions of semantic consequence,
pointing out that both are commonly used in elementary mathematics.
Kleene’s textbook contains the following example: the arithmetical formula (x+y)2 =
x2 + 2xy + y2 begs to be understood as an identity (valid for all natural numbers x),
whereas the arithmetical formula x2 + 2 = 3x begs to be understood as an equation
(i.e., as a condition on x). There is no special syntax to reflect this obvious distinction
in meaning. Yet it is not illusory, as it is reflected in use. For, as noted by Avron,
when “dealing with identities [...] the substitution rule is available, and one may infer
sin x = 2 sin x
2
cos x
2
from the identity sin 2x = 2 sin x cosx. In contrast, [...] substituting
x
2
for x everywhere in an equation is an error” (see references in [1; §4]).
In fact, the difference between the two variants of syntactic consequence is due to the
implicit presence of a first-order meta-quantifier in one of them.
Example 2.3. In intuitionistic logic, the principle of excluded middle is derivable from
the double negation principle (due to the derivability of the schema ¬¬(γ ∨ ¬γ)). Nev-
ertheless, the schema α∨¬α expressing the principle of excluded middle is not derivable
from the schema ¬¬α → α expressing the double negation principle (since for α = ¬β
the latter is derivable, and the former is not). Thus the widespread practice of expressing
principles by schemata is in a sense misleading.
In fact, the difference between principles and schemata is due to the implicit presence
of a second-order meta-quantifier in principles.
But, actually, the explicit use of the second-order meta-quantifier makes the whole con-
cept of schemata (i.e., the formal use of metavariables for this purpose) superfluous. Let
us recall that early textbooks on first-order logic, such as those of Hilbert–Ackermann,
Hilbert–Bernays and P. S. Novikov did not speak of any schemata, but only of formulas;
instead, their derivation systems included a substitution rule. Some problems with this
early approach are that inference rules were anyway stated in schematic form, and also
that the substitution rule is, in contrast to other inference rules, not structural (i.e. it is
not preserved itself by substitution without anonymous variables). Non-structurality is
a serious complication in trying to treat rules as fully formal objects.
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In fact, the use of both first-order and second-order meta-quantifiers enables one
to state (structural) rules without using meta-variables; and one way to understand
the substitution rule is that it is not an inference rule of the logic, but an inference
meta-rule of the meta-logic. An advantage of this approach is that side conditions
that normally occur in first-order logics, such as “provided that x is not free in α” or
“provided that t is free for x in α(x)” effectively disappear (more precisely, they remain
at the meta-level, but they disappear from what needs to be specified in order to state
rules and principles). One consequence of not having to specify exactly which English
phrases qualify as “side conditions” in rules and principles is that it becomes feasible to
give actual formal definitions of these notions (a rule and a principle) as well as further
notions such as a derivable rule, an admissible rule, a first-order logic, and (both variants
of) syntactic consequence.
2.3.2. Meta-formulas. The language of the meta-logic7 of a two-sorted first-order logic
involves, in addition to the basic types 0, 1i and 1c, a fourth basic type:
• µ, the type of meta-formulas;
and consists of the following constants (common to all two-sorted first-order logics).
Reflection operators:
• !i : 1i → µ, the i-reflection;
• !c : 1c → µ, the c-reflection,
meta-connectives:
• & : µ× µ→ µ, the meta-conjunction;
• ⇒: µ× µ→ µ, the meta-implication,
and meta-quantifiers
• q : (0→ µ)→ µ, the first-order (universal) meta-quantifier;
• qni : ((0
n
→ 1i)→ µ) → µ, the n-ary second-order (universal) i-meta-quantifier;
• qnc : ((0
n
→ 1c) → µ)→ µ, the n-ary second-order (universal) c-meta-quantifier.
Here n ranges over N = {0, 1, 2, . . .}. In practice, meta-quantifiers are written like
the old-style (early 20th century) universal quantifiers, but with fancy parentheses ⟮·⟯
so as to avoid visual confusion with the ordinary parentheses (·): if q : (∆ → µ) → µ
is a meta-quantifier (either of them), F is a λ-expression of type µ, and x is a variable
of type ∆, then ⟮x⟯ F abbreviates the λ-expression q(x 7→ F). More generally, ⟮~x⟯ F
abbreviates q(~x 7→ F).
An atomic meta-formula is a λ-expression of type µ that is either of the form !cF ,
where F is a c-formula, or of the form !iΦ, where Φ is an i-formula. A meta-formula
is a λ-expression of type µ built out of atomic meta-formulas using meta-connectives
and meta-quantifiers. We usually omit !c and !i in writing λ-expressions of type µ;
thus atomic meta-formulas are effectively identified with formulas, keeping in mind that
meta-connectives and meta-quantifiers cannot be used inside of formulas.
7Not to be confused with the meta-language of a logic. (This one would have to be formalized if we
were to give a formal treatment of schemata.)
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As usual, F ⇔ G abbreviates (F ⇒ G) & (G ⇒ F); “⇔” is called meta-equivalence.
We stick to the following order of precedence of logical and meta-logical symbols (in
groups of equal priority, starting with higher precedence/stronger binding):
(1) !, ?, ¬, ∃ and ∀;
(2) ∧ and ∨;
(3) → and ↔;
(4) ⟮·⟯ ;
(5) &;
(6) ⇒ and ⇔.
2.3.3. Meta-rules. The inference meta-rules (i.e., the inference rules of the meta-logic)
are the α-conversion rule for meta-formulas:
...
F
G
, if F is α-equivalent to G,
and the usual introduction/elimination rules of natural deduction for &, ⇒ and the
meta-quantifiers:
...
F
...
G
F & G
...
F & G
F
...
F & G
G
...
F
...
F ⇒ G
G
[F ]
...
G
F ⇒ G
,
where F and G are meta-formulas;
...
F
⟮x⟯F
, provided that x does not occur freely in any of the assumptions;
...
⟮x⟯F
F [x/T ]
, provided that T is free for x in F ,
where F is a meta-formula, and there are three ways to read x and T :
(1) x is an individual variable and T is a term;
(2) x is an n-ary problem variable and T is an n-i-formula;
(3) x is an n-ary predicate variable, T is an n-c-formula.
It should be noted that F [x/T ] boils down to the ordinary substitution F|x:=T of
λ-calculus in the case (1), but not in the cases (2), (3) (see §2.1 above).
Let us note that by using a meta-specialization (=meta-quantifier elimination meta-
rule) immediately after the corresponding meta-generalization (=meta-quantifier intro-
duction meta-rule), we get the meta-rules of substitution:
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...
F
F [x/T ]
, as long as x does not occur freely in the assumptions and T is free for x in F .
A meta-formula F is called deducible if using the meta-rules one can obtain (from the
trivial deductions, in which a meta-formula is deduced from itself) a deduction of F
from no assumptions.
2.3.4. Syntactic meta-sugar. The first-order meta-closure ⟮⟯F of the meta-formula F is
⟮~x⟯F , where ~x is the tuple of all individual variables occurring freely in F . The second-
order meta-closure ⟮⟯F is ⟮~γ⟯F , where ~γ is the tuple of all predicate and problem
variables occurring freely in F .
A rule, written A1, . . . , Am/B, or, in more detail,
A1, . . . , Am
B
,
where A1, . . . , Am and B are formulas, is an abbreviation for the meta-formula
⟮⟯
(
⟮⟯A1 & · · ·& ⟮⟯Am =⇒ ⟮⟯B
)
.
The formulas A1, . . . , Am are called the premisses of the rule, and B its conclusion.
If B is a formula (and only in this case) we abbreviate ⟮⟯ ⟮⟯B by ·B. A meta-formula
of the form ·B, where B is a formula, is called a principle. In other words, a principle
is a formula that is meta-quantified over all its free (individual, predicate and problem)
variables. Rules with no premisses can be identified with principles, in the sense that
each meta-formula of the form ( /B) ⇔ ·B is deducible, as long as the empty meta-
conjunction is defined as an abbreviation of some deducible meta-formula (for example,
⟮γ⟯ γ ⇒ ⟮γ⟯ γ).
The difference between formulas and principles is clear from Example 2.3: in (the
meta-logical extension of) intuitionistic logic, the meta-formula
·¬¬α→ α⇒ ·α ∨ ¬α
is deducible, whereas the meta-formula
¬¬α→ α⇒ α ∨ ¬α
is not deducible.
A derivation system8 D is a meta-formula of the form
H1 & · · ·&Hk,
where each Hi is a rule (possibly with no premisses) in the pure language of QHC. The
Hi with no premisses, or rather the corresponding principles, are called the laws, and
the Hi with at least one premise are called the inference rules.
8Also called a “deductive system” in the literature. For our purposes it is convenient to distinguish
meta-logical deductions from derivations in a specific logic.
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A logic is a meta-equivalence class of derivation systems. In other words, derivation
systems D and D′ are said to determine the same logic if the meta-formula D ⇔ D′ is
deducible.
A meta-formula F is called derivable in the logic determined by a derivation system D
if the meta-formula D ⇒ G is deducible (in the meta-logic). Clearly, adding a derivable
principle or rule to a derivation system D does not affect derivability of principles and
rules in the logic determined by D.
If L is the logic determined by a derivation system D, we denote by ⊢ F , or in more
detail ⊢L F , the judgement that the meta-formula F is derivable in the logic. The
meta-meta-logical symbol ⊢ is set to have lower priority than all logical and meta-logical
symbols. The judgement ⊢ F1 & · · ·& Fm ⇒ G is also abbreviated by
F1, . . . ,Fm ⊢ G.
When this judgement is true, we also say that G is a (syntactic) consequence of the
Fi. This yields two notion of syntactic consequence for formulas: A1, . . . , Am ⊢ B is
the traditional “fixed variables” one, as in the textbooks by Church, Troelstra and van
Dalen; whereas ⟮⟯A1, . . . , ⟮⟯Am ⊢ ⟮⟯B is the traditional “varied variables” one, as in
the textbooks by Schoenfield and Mendelson. There seems to be no standard notation
for the judgement of interderivability for formulas:
⊢ A⇔ B
so we will keep it in this form. Let us note that, due to the absence of the deduction
theorem in QHC, it is weaker than the (object-level) equivalence (which makes sense
when both if A and B are either i-formulas or c-formulas),
⊢ A↔ B,
but stronger than the equivalence of principles,
⊢ ·A⇔ ·B,
which is in turn stronger than the equivalence of judgements:
⊢ A if and only if ⊢ B.
2.4. Derivation system
When writing down a derivation system for a new logic, one has to engage in informal
considerations, or else risk the new logic being entirely unmotivated.
To provide an informal mathematical meaning to the judgements of QHC, we interpret
c-formulas by propositions/predicates and i-formulas by problems. More precisely, we
instantiate predicate variables and problem variables by particular mathematical pred-
icates and problems. Upon such instantiation, classical connectives and quantifiers are
interpreted according to the usual truth tables; intuitionistic connectives and quantifiers
according to the BHK interpretation, in Kolmogorov’s problem solving terminology (see
A GALOIS CONNECTION BETWEEN INTUITIONISTIC & CLASSICAL LOGICS. I: SYNTAX 16
below); and the conversion operators ! and ? are interpreted as in §1. The interpretation
of the meta-logical constants and judgements will be discussed in part II.
Some laws and inference rules of the QHC calculus are immediate:
• All laws and inference rules of classical predicate logic (see [1; §4.6]) applied to
all c-formulas (possibly involving ? and !).
• All laws and inference rules of intuitionistic first-order logic (see [1; §4.6]) applied
to all i-formulas (possibly involving ? and !).
We will now discuss the remaining part of the derivation system.
2.4.1. From the problem interpretation. Let us recall Kolmogorov’s problem interpreta-
tion of intuitionistic logic [36] (with minor improvements largely due to Heyting; see
[1; §3.7, §3.8] for further details).9
A prescribed class of contentful (e.g. mathematical) primitive problems is fixed, and it
is assumed to be known what is a solution of a primitive problem. For instance, Euclid’s
first three postulates are the following primitive problems:
(1) draw a straight line segment from a given point to a given point;
(2) extend any given straight line segment continuously to a longer one;
(3) draw a circle with a given center and a given radius.
We may thus stipulate that each of (1) and (3) has a unique solution, and describe all
possible solutions of (2). (Euclid’s Elements will be discussed in some detail in part III
of the present paper.)
Composite problems are obtained from the primitive ones by using contentual connec-
tives ∧, ∨, →, ¬, × and quantifiers ∀, ∃. (They are “contentual” in that they provide a
natural interpretation of, but should not be conflated with, the connectives and quanti-
fiers in the formal language of intuitionistic logic.) What it is a solution of a composite
problem is explained as follows:
• a solution of Γ ∧∆ consists of a solution of Γ and a solution of ∆;
• a solution of Γ ∨∆ consists of an explicit choice between Γ and ∆ along with a
solution of the chosen problem;
• a solution of Γ→ ∆ is a reduction of ∆ to Γ; that is, a general method of solving
∆ on the basis of any given solution of Γ;
• the absurdity × has no solutions; ¬Γ is an abbreviation for Γ→×;
• a solution of ∃xΘ(x) is a solution of Θ(x0) for some explicitly chosen x0 ∈ D;
• a solution of ∀xΘ(x) is a general method of solving Θ(x0) for all x0 ∈ D.
A key element here is the idea of a “general method” (roughly corresponding to the
idea of a “construction” advocated by Brouwer and Heyting), which Kolmogorov further
explains as follows. If Γ(풳) is a problem depending on the parameter 풳 “of any sort”,
then “to present a general method of solving Γ(풳) for every particular value of 풳”
9This can also be understood as the BHK interpretation presented in Kolmogorov’s language. However,
given that Heyting’s early ideas are often conflated with the BHK interpretation in the literature, but
will be understood in a very different way below, as providing a complement to the BHK interpretation,
one must be very careful here about exactly what is meant by the “BHK interpetation”.
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should be understood as “to be able to solve Γ(풳0) for every given specific value of 풳0
of the variable 풳 by a finite sequence of steps, known in advance (i.e. before the choice
of 풳0)”.
Let us observe that if |Γ| denotes the set of solutions of the problem Γ, then the above
clauses guarantee that:
• |Γ ∧∆| is the product |Γ| × |∆|;
• |Γ ∨∆| is the disjoint union |Γ| ⊔ |∆|;
• there is a map ℱ : |Γ→ ∆| → Hom(|Γ|, |∆|) into the set of all maps;
• |×| = ∅;
• |∃xΘ(x)| is the disjoint union
⊔
d∈D |Θ(d)|;
• there is a map 풢 : |∀xΘ(x)| →
∏
d∈D |Θ(d)| into the product.
Now the proposition “Γ has a solution” can be rephrased as “ |Γ| 6= ∅”. It follows
that the following propositions must be true for any contentful problems Γ, ∆ and any
contentful parametric problem Θ:
• ?(Γ ∧∆) ←→ ?Γ ∧ ?∆;
• ?(Γ ∨∆) ←→ ?Γ ∨ ?∆;
• ?(Γ→ ∆) −→ (?Γ→ ?∆);
• ¬?×;
• ?∃xΘ(x) ←→ ∃x ?Θ(x);
• ?∀xΘ(x) −→ ∀x ?Θ(x).
See [1; §3.8] for a more thorough discussion of these propositions.
This motivates some laws of QHC (beware that some of these will turn out to be
redundant):
(?∧) ·?(γ ∧ δ) ←→ ?γ ∧ ?δ;
(?∨) ·?(γ ∨ δ) ←→ ?γ ∨ ?δ;
(?
→
) ·?(γ→ δ) −→ (?γ→ ?δ);
(?⊥) ·¬?×;
(?∃) ·?∃x θ(x) ←→ ∃x ?θ(x);
(?∀) ·?∀x θ(x) −→ ∀x ?θ(x).
It should be noted that formulas with almost same appearance and motivation, but
somewhat different meaning appear in [1; §5.1].
Informally, (?⊥) is saying that × is not just the hardest problem (as guaranteed by
the explosion principle, ·×→ γ), but a problem that has no solutions whatsoever. This
is just the first example of how some content found in the BHK interpretation and not
entirely captured in the usual formalization of intuitionistic logic is more fully captured
in QHC.
Some versions of the BHK interpretation include the well-known principle (see [1;
§3.8]), that every solution of a problem Γ must be supplied with a proof that is it
indeed a solution of Γ. This principle was emphasized by G. Kreisel in connection with
interpreting intuitionistic logic (in a somewhat different form) and also by the ancient
A GALOIS CONNECTION BETWEEN INTUITIONISTIC & CLASSICAL LOGICS. I: SYNTAX 18
Greeks, particularly Proclus, in the context of geometric construction problems, which
as we now know can be seen as a model of intuitionistic logic (see [3]). This Proclus–
Kreisel principle is usually considered to be relevant when one tries to make sense out
the BHK interpretation in the context of first-order logic, rather than a constructive
type theory (see references in [1; §3.8]).
A consequence of this Proclus–Kreisel principle is that a solution of a problem Γ yields
a proof of the existence of a solution of Γ. This is expressible in the language of QHC:
(!?) ·γ→ !?γ.
2.4.2. From the proof interpretation. The remaining part of the derivation system is
motivated by the proof interpretation of intuitionistic logic, given independently by
Orlov and Heyting (see details in §6.2.1) and partially formalized in Go¨del’s translation
of intuitionistic logic into classical modal logic S4 (see [1; §5.7.3]). A remarkable attempt
to clarify the informal notion of “proof” used by Orlov and Heyting occurs in Go¨del’s
sketch of a proof-relevant analogue of S4, which is found in his outline of a 1938 lecture,
published posthumously in his collected works [21].
Go¨del’s proposal is based on a ternary relation “zBp, q, that is, z is a derivation of q
from p”. But as a matter of fact he also uses a binary relation “aBq” which is presumably
meant to abbreviate aB⊤, q. Here B stands for German Beweis (proof), and apparently
refers to proofs “understood not in a particular system, but in the absolute sense (that
is, one can make it evident)” (these words of Go¨del appears earlier on the same page).
Go¨del’s axioms for B are as follows (literally):
(1) “zBϕ(x, y) −→ ϕ(x, y)”;
(2) “uBv −→ u′B(uBv)”;
(3) “zBp, q & uBq, r −→ f(z, u)Bp, r”;
(4) “if q has been proved and a is the proof, [then] aBq is to be written down”.
Instead of attempting to clarify the meaning of this in Go¨del’s original terms, let
us consider something similar but more clearly described: the extension of classical
predicate logic by
• an operator : associating to every formula F and every term t a formula t :F ;
• an unary function ′ that associates to every term t a term t′;
• a binary function [·] that associates to every two terms s, t a term s[t];
• an operator ∗ that associates to every formula F a term ∗F ,
that satisfies all laws and inference rules of classical predicate logic along with the fol-
lowing additional ones:
(i) · t :p −→ p;
(ii) · t :p −→ t′ :(t :p);
(iii) · s :(p→ q) −→ (t :p→ s[t] :q);
(iv)
p
∗p :p
.
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S. Arte¨mov discovered that a further extension of this logic by an additional function
(“sum of proofs”) and an additional law (not hinted at in any way by Go¨del) is indeed
a proof-relevant analogue of S4 in a sense one could expect [7].10 But we do not need
these for our motivational purposes.
The logic just described has the following derived principles and rules:
(i′) ·¬(t :⊥);
(i′′) ·∃t t :p −→ p;
(i′′′)
t :p
p
;
(ii′) · t :p −→ t˜ :(∃t t :p).
Here (i′) is just the special case of (i) with p substituted by the classical falsity ⊥.
Next, (i′′) is derived from (i) by using two inference rules of classical logic: q(t) / ∀t q(t)
and ∀t (r(t) → p) / ∃t r(t) → p. Of course, (i′′′) is derived from (i) using the modus
ponens rule. To establish (ii′), let us first note that from the classical law q(t)→ ∃t q(t)
we get t :p→ ∃t t :p, and if F denotes the latter formula, then by (iv) we get ∗F :(t :p→
∃t t :p). Now from (iii) and the modus ponens rule we get t′ :(t :p) → ∗F[t
′] :(∃t t :p).
Finally, (ii′) follows from this and (ii), if we set t˜ = ∗F[t
′].
Just like Go¨del’s proofs “in the absolute sense”, the “proofs” of propositions referred
to in the intended reading of the problem !P , Find a proof of P , are not supposed to be
formal proofs. In the language of QHC, we have the following direct analogues of (i′),
(i′′), (ii′), (iii), (iv) and (i′′′):
(!⊥) ·¬!⊥;
(?!) ·?!p→ p;
(!?′) · !p→ !?!p;
(!
→
) · !(p→ q) −→ (!p→ !q);
(!⊤)
p
!p
;
(!′
⊤
)
!p
p
.
Here (!⊥) is a kind of internal soundness: a proof of falsity leads to absurdity. Seman-
tically (informally), this is pretty much like in Go¨del’s system; but let us note that (i′)
is about the c-formula p :⊥ −→ ⊥, whereas (!⊥) is about the i-formula !⊥ → ×. In
contrast, (?⊥) is about the c-formula ?× → ⊥. Note that by the explosion principle,
the reverse implications to (?⊥) and (!⊥) are trivial. Thus (?⊥) identifies the classical
falsity, ⊥, with the proposition “× has a solution”; and (!⊥) identifies the intuitionistic
absurdity, ×, with the problem “Prove ⊥”.
10In fact, the rule p/∗p is only applied to axioms in Arte¨mov’s logic. The reason why one cannot do
without the “sum of proofs” is clear from [7; Example 5.6].
A GALOIS CONNECTION BETWEEN INTUITIONISTIC & CLASSICAL LOGICS. I: SYNTAX 20
This completes the list of additional inference rules and laws of QHC. Let us note that
(?!′) can be dropped from this list since it follows immediately from (?!), (!⊤) and (!→).
Some other laws will be shown to be redundant in 3.6.
3. Symmetries and redundancy
3.1. Galois connection
Proposition 3.1. The inference rule (!′
⊤
) is equivalent to the following inference rule:
(?⊤)
γ
?γ
.
We will see in [2] that the converse rule, ?γ /γ, is not derivable in QHC.
Proof. Given (!′⊤), we can derive (?⊤) using (!?): γ, γ → !?γ / !?γ and !?γ / ?γ. Con-
versely, given (?⊤), we can derive (!
′
⊤
) using (?!): !p / ?!p and ?!p, ?!p→ p / p. 
The equivalence relations ⊢ Φ ↔ Ψ on i-formulas and ⊢ F ↔ G on c-formulas yield
the “Lindenbaum” poset of equivalence classes of i-problems, ordered by [Φ] ≥ [Ψ] if
⊢ Φ→ Ψ, and the “Lindenbaum” poset of equivalence classes of c-problems, ordered by
[F ] ≥ [G] if ⊢ F → G. By (?⊤) and (?→), and respectively (!⊤) and (!→) we have:
• ⊢ Φ→ Ψ implies ⊢ ?Φ→ ?Ψ;
• ⊢ F → G implies ⊢ !F → !G.
Thus ? and ! descend to monotone maps between the two posets. Using the monotonicity
of ? and ! and substitution, from (?!) and (!?) we also obtain:
• ⊢ !?!F ↔ !G;
• ⊢ ?!?Φ↔ ?Ψ.
These identities resemble well-known properties of a Galois connection. Indeed, it turns
out that our two monotone maps do form a Galois connection between the two Linden-
baum posets:
Theorem 3.2. For an i-formula Φ and a c-formula F , ⊢ ?Φ → F if and only if
⊢ Φ→ !F .
The same argument works to prove a slightly stronger assertion, ⊢ ?α→ p⇔ α→ !p.
Proof. If ⊢ Φ→ !F , then ⊢ ?Φ→ ?!F . So from (?!) we get ⊢ ?Φ→ F .
Conversely, if ⊢ ?Φ→ F , then ⊢ !?Φ→ !F . So from (!?) we get ⊢ Φ→ !F . 
Another standard fact on Galois connections takes the following form in our situation.
Corollary 3.3. Let F denote a c-formula and let Φ denote an i-formula.
(a) [!F ] is the least among all [Φ] such that [?Φ] is an upper bound of [F ]; and [?Φ] is
the greatest among all [F ] such that [!F ] is a lower bound of [F ].
(b) [?!F ] is the least of all upper bounds of [F ] of the form [?Φ]; and [!?Φ] is the
greatest of all lower bounds of [Φ] of the form [!F ].
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Proof. The first assertion of (a) says that ⊢ ?!F → F , and if ⊢ ?Φ→ F , then ⊢ Φ→ !F .
This is indeed so by (?!) and by 3.2. The first assertion of (b) says that ⊢ ?!F → F ,
and if ⊢ ?Φ → F , then ⊢ ?Φ → ?!F . This follows similarly, using additionally the
monotonicity of ?. The second assertions of (a) and (b) are proved similarly. 
3.2. Modalities
Let us write F for the c-formula ?!F , and ∇Φ for the i-formula !?Φ. Upon substitut-
ing problems and propositions for the atoms of F and Φ, these are interpreted by the
proposition P , “There exists a proof of P ”, and the problem ∇Γ, “Prove that Γ has
a solution”. By another standard fact on Galois connections, the “provability” operator
 = ?! descends to an interior operator (in the sense of order theory) on the poset of
equivalence classes of c-formulas, whereas the “solubility” operator ∇ = !? descends to
a closure operator (in the same sense) on the poset of equivalence classes of i-formulas.
In the case of , this amounts to (i) the derivability in QHC of the principles
(1) ·p→ p;
(2) ·p→ p;
and (ii) the judgement
(∗) ⊢ F → G implies ⊢ F → G.
These are easy to verify directly: (1) is the same as (?!); (2) follows from (!?) and the
monotonicity of ?; and (∗) follows from the monotonicity of ! and ?.
In fact, (∗) is a consequence of the derivability in QHC of the following principle and
rule:
(3) p /p;
(4) ·(p→ q) −→ (p→ q);
Here (3) follows from (!⊤) and (?⊤), and (4
) from (!
→
) and (?
→
). We have proved
Proposition 3.4. Sending  to ?! yields a syntactic interpretation of QS4 in QHC,
which is the identity on QC.
We will see in §5.1 that this interpretation is exact. Before we get there, we need to
distinguish two roles of the symbol “”: the modality of QS4 and an abbreviation for ?!
in QHC.
Similarly, that ∇ induces a closure operator on the poset of equivalence classes of
c-formulas translates to (i) the derivability in QHC of the principles
(1∇) ·α→∇α;
(2∇) ·∇∇α→∇α,
and (ii) the judgement
(∗) ⊢ Φ→ Ψ implies ⊢ ∇Φ→∇Ψ.
Here (∗) is a consequence of the derivability in QHC of the principle
(4∇) ⊢ ∇(α→ β) −→ (∇α→∇β),
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which follows from (!
→
) and (?
→
). We also note that the following consequence of (?⊥)
and (!⊥),
(3∇) ·∇×→×,
is equivalent (modulo (1∇) and (4∇)) to ¬α /¬∇α (cf. §3.4 below), which can be con-
sidered to be dual to (3). We define QH4 to be the logic obtained from QH by adding
a new unary connective ∇ and additional laws (1∇)–(4∇). We have thus proved:
Proposition 3.5. Sending ∇ to !? yields a syntactic interpretation of QH4 in QHC,
which is the identity on QH.
It should be noted that the laws of QH4 mimic some properties of ¬¬. In fact,
by substituting ¬¬ for ∇ we get an interpretation of QH4 in QH. Indeed, under this
substitution, (1∇) holds by ([1; §3.14, (1)]), (2∇) and (3∇) follow from ([1; §3.14, (3)]),
and (4∇) holds by ([1; §3.14, (44)]). Let us note that since the purely intuitionistic
fragment of QH4 is fixed under this interpretation, this fragment is precisely QH (in
other words, QH4 is a conservative extension of QH). We will see in §5.3 that the
constructed interpretation of QH4 in QH factors through the interpretation of 3.5.
It is not clear to the author whether the interpretation of 3.5 is faithful (in other words,
whether QHC is a conservative extension of QH4). Thus one should not conflate two
potentially distinct roles of the symbol “∇”: the modality of QH4 and an abbreviation
for !? in QHC.
The modal logic QH4 was studied by Aczel, who called the modality satisfying (1∇)–
(4∇) a strict lax modality [4], and more recently also by Arte¨mov and Protopopescu,
who showed its completeness with respect to some Kripke models [9]. The intuitionistic
modal logic given by the postulate schemes (1∇)–(3∇) was studied by Curry (1952, 57),
Goldblatt (1979, 81) and many others; in particular, categorical models of QH4 related
to the sheaf-valued models of QH in [1] are known; see [17], [23], [6].
The properties of ∇ are also similar to those of the squash/bracket operator in de-
pendent type theory (see [10] and references there).
3.3. Simplification
Proposition 3.6. (a) The laws (?∧), (?∨), (?⊥), (?∀) and (?∃) are redundant.
(b) The following holds in QHC:
(!∧) ⊢ !p ∧ !q ←→ !(p ∧ q);
(!∨) ⊢ !p ∨ !q −→ !(p ∨ q);
(!∀) ⊢ ∀x !p(x) ←→ !∀xp(x);
(!∃) ⊢ ∃x !p(x) −→ !∃xp(x).
Remark 3.7. From the informal semantic viewpoint, the implication ⊢ !p ∨ !q→ !(p ∨ q)
cannot be reversed. Indeed, let P be the proposition ii is a rational number and Q the
proposition ii is an irrational real number. The problem !(P ∨ Q) amounts to showing
that ii is a real number. This problem is trivial: ii = (eiπ/2)i = e−π/2. On the other hand,
the problem !P ∨ !Q amounts to !(P ∨Q)∧Γ, where Γ is the problem Determine whether
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e−π/2 is rational or irrational. This is not an easy problem.11 This shows incidentally
that one cannot get an exact interpretation of classical logic in intuitionistic logic by
just looking at problems of the form !P , where P is a proposition.
Proof. Redundancy of (?∀). By an intuitionistic law, ⊢ ∀xα(x) → α(t). Then by (?⊤)
and (?
→
), we get ⊢ ?∀xα(x)→ ?α(t). By the generalization rule, we obtain ⊢ ∀t [?∀xα(x)→
?α(t)]. By another intuitionistic rule, we infer that ⊢ ?∀xα(x)→ ∀t ?α(t). Now the vari-
able can be renamed. 
Redundancy of (?∧). The→ implication in (?∧) is redundant similarly to the redundancy
of (?∀). Conversely, the intuitionistic validity α ∧ β → α ∧ β can be rewritten, by
the exponential law, as α → (β → (α ∧ β)). Then by (?⊤) and (?→) it follows that
⊢ ?α→ (?β→ ?(α∧β)). Again applying the exponential law, this time regarded as an
inference rule of classical logic, we obtain ⊢ ?α ∧ ?β→ ?(α ∧ β). 
Proof of (!∃) and (!∨). This is parallel to the redundancy of (?∀). In more detail, by a
classical axiom scheme, ⊢ p(t) → ∃xp(x). Then by (!⊤) and (!→), we get ⊢ !p(t) →
!∃xp(x). By the generalization rule, we obtain ⊢ ∀t [!p(t) → !∃xp(x)]. By another
classical rule, we get ⊢ ∃t !p(t)→ !∃xp(x). Now the variable can be renamed. The case
of (!∨) is similar. 
Redundancy of (?∃) and (?∨). The ← implication in (?∃) is redundant similarly to the
proof of (!∃) or to the redundancy of (?∀). Conversely, by the proof of (!∃) we have shown
that ⊢ ∃x !p(x)→ !∃xp(x) using only (!⊤), (!→) and classical logic. Substituting, we get
⊢ ∃x !?α(x) → !∃x ?α(x). On the other hand, from (!?) it follows that ⊢ ∃xα(x) →
∃x !?α(x). By combining the two implications we get ⊢ ∃xα(x) → !∃x ?α(x). By the
proof of 3.2, we obtain from this the → implication in (?∃), using only (?⊤), (?→) and
(?!). The case of (?∨) is similar. 
Proof of (!∀) and (!∧). The ← implication in (!∀) is proved similarly to the redundancy
of (?∀). The converse implication is parallel to the redundancy of (?∃). In more detail,
(?∀) implies ⊢ ?∀x !p(x)→ ∀x ?!p(x), and it follows from (?!) that ⊢ ∀x ?!p(x)→ ∀xp(x).
Thus ⊢ ?∀x !p(x) → ∀xp(x), hence by 3.2 ⊢ ∀x !p(x) → !∀xp(x). The case of (!∧) is
similar, or alternatively can be treated similarly to the redundancy of (?∧). 
Redundancy of (?⊥). By the explosion principle, we have ⊢×→ !⊥. Then by (?⊤) and
(?
→
) we get ⊢ ?× → ?!⊥. On the other hand, by (?!) we have ⊢ ?!⊥ → ⊥. Composing
the two implications, we obtain ⊢ ?×→ ⊥. 
Corollary 3.8. The meta-conjunction of the following meta-formulas is a deductive
system for QHC.
• A deductive system for intuitionistic logic;
• A deductive system for classical logic;
11In fact, ii is transcendental by the Gelfond–Schneider theorem.
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(!⊤)
p
!p
;
(?⊤)
α
?α
;
(?!) ?!p→ p;
(!?) α→ !?α;
(!
→
) !(p→ q) −→ (!p→ !q);
(?
→
) ?(α→ β) −→ (?α→ ?β);
(!⊥) ¬!⊥.
3.4. Negation
Proposition 3.9. Some laws of QHC can be rewritten as follows.
(a) (?⊥) is equivalent, modulo (?→) and (?⊤), to ·?¬α→ ¬?α and to ¬α /¬?α;
(b) (!⊥) is equivalent, modulo (!→) and (!⊤), to · !¬p→ ¬!p and to ¬p /¬!p.
Proof. (a). By (?
→
), we have ⊢ ?(α→×)→ (?α→ ?×). Assuming (?⊥), we also have
⊢ ?×→ ⊥. Hence ⊢ ?(α→ ×)→ (?α→ ⊥); that is, ⊢ ?¬α→ ¬?α.
By (?⊤) we have ¬α ⊢ ?¬α. Assuming ·?¬α → ¬?α, by modus ponens we have
?¬α ⊢ ¬?α. Combining these yields ¬α ⊢ ¬?α.
Finally, assuming ¬α /¬?α, we have, in particular, ¬× ⊢ ¬?×. Since ¬× = ×→ ×
is an intuitionistic validity, we get ⊢ ¬?×. 
(b). By (!
→
), we have ⊢ !(p→ ⊥)→ (!p→ !⊥). Assuming (!⊥), we also have ⊢ !⊥ →×.
Hence ⊢ !(p→ ⊥)→ (!p→×); that is, ⊢ !¬p→ ¬!p.
By (!⊤) we have ¬p ⊢ !¬p. Assuming · !¬p → ¬!p, by modus ponens we have !¬p ⊢
¬!p. Combining these yields ¬p ⊢ ¬!p.
Finally, assuming ¬p /¬!p, we have, in particular, ¬⊥ ⊢ ¬!⊥. Since ¬⊥ = ⊥ → ⊥ is
a classical validity, we get ⊢ ¬!⊥. 
Proposition 3.10. ⊢ ¬α↔ !¬?α.
This yields a definition of intuitionistic negation in terms of classical one. As discussed
in detail in [1; §3.8], this fully agrees with the BHK interpretation (and with a remark by
Heyting; but disagrees with a remark by Kolmogorov). Thus, this is yet another feature
of the BHK interpretation that is captured in QHC but not in the usual formalization
of intuitionistic logic.
Proof. By (!?), ⊢ ¬α→ !?¬α, from 3.9 we get ⊢ !?¬α→ !¬?α and ⊢ !¬?α→ ¬!?α, and
by the contrapositive of (!?), ⊢ ¬!?α→ ¬α. 
Remark 3.11. Since ⊢ ¬¬(α ∨ ¬α) (see [1; (32)]), by 3.10 and by the converse of (!⊤),
we have ⊢ ¬¬?(α ∨ ¬α); thus it is impossible to prove that α ∨ ¬α has no solutions.
Corollary 3.12. ⊢ ?¬α if and only if ⊢ ¬?α.
Here the “only if” part is a consequence of 3.9(a). The “if” part can also be stated in
a stronger form: ¬?α ⊢ ?¬α.
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Proof. Indeed, we have ¬?α ⊢ ?!¬?α by (!⊤) and (?⊤), and ⊢ ?!¬?α↔ ?¬α by 3.10. 
Corollary 3.13. ⊢ ¬∇α ←→ ¬α and ⊢ ¬α ←→ ∇¬α.
This follows from the proof of 3.10.
We note that Corollary 3.13 implies that ⊢ ¬¬α ←→ ¬∇¬α and ⊢ ¬∇¬α ←→
¬(¬∇¬)¬α, which is in contrast with ⊢ ¬(¬¬)¬p↔ p.
Corollary 3.14. ⊢ ∇α→ ¬¬α.
Proof. By 3.13, ⊢ ¬α→ ¬∇α. Then [1; §3.14, (33)] yields ⊢ ∇α→ ¬¬α. 
In fact, ·∇α→ ¬¬α is yet another equivalent form of the law (!⊥), since ∇×→ ¬¬×
implies ∇× → ×, or !⊥ → ×. Moreover, as observed in [4], ·∇α → ¬¬α is also an
equivalent form of the law (4∇) of QH4.
Remark 3.15. Using 3.10, the following consequence can be drawn from the fact that
the implication of (!
→
) goes, in a sense, in the opposite direction with respect to that of
(!∨) and with respect to one of the implications of (!∧). The intuitionistic implications
⊢ α ∨ β → ¬(¬α ∧ ¬β) and ⊢ α ∨ β → ¬α → β (cf. [1; (1), (29) and (7)]), when
specialized to the image of !, i.e., in the form ⊢ !p ∨ !q → ¬!p → !q and ⊢ !p ∨ !q →
¬(¬!p ∧ ¬!q), each factor into two irreversible (as we will see in [2]) implications in
QHC: ⊢ !p ∨ !q −→ !(p ∨ q) and ⊢ !(¬p → q) −→ !¬p → !q; respectively,
⊢ !p ∨ !q −→ !(p ∨q) and ⊢ !¬(¬p ∧ ¬q) −→ ¬(!¬p ∧ !¬q).
3.5. Implication
Proposition 3.16. (a) ⊢ !?α→ !?β ←→ !(?α→ ?β);
(b) ⊢ ?!p→ ?!q ⇐⇒ ?(!p→ !q).
We will actually prove stronger assertions:
(a) ⊢ !?α→ !q −→ !(?α→ q);
(b) ?α→ ?!q ⊢ ?(α→ !q).
(Their converses follow from (!
→
) and (?
→
), respectively.)
Proof. (a). By (?
→
), ⊢ ?(!?α→ !q)→ (?!?α→ ?!q). Since ⊢ ?!?α↔ ?α and ⊢ ?!q→ q,
we get ⊢ ?(!?α→ !q)→ (?α→ q). Then by 3.2, ⊢ (!?α→ !q) −→ !(?α→ q). 
(b). By (!⊤), ?α → ?!q ⊢ !(?α → ?!q), and by (a), ⊢ !(?α → ?!q) → (!?α → !?!q).
Since ⊢ α → !?α and ⊢ !?!q ↔ q, we get ⊢ !(?α → ?!q) → (α → !q). Finally, by (?⊤),
α→ !q ⊢ ?(α→ !q). 
The following proposition strengthens 3.3(b). In addition, its part (a) along with part
(a) of the preceding proposition generalize 3.10 and 3.13.
Proposition 3.17. We have
(a) ⊢ (∇α→∇β) ←→ (α→∇β) and ⊢ ∇(α→∇β) ←→ (α→ ∇β);
(b) ⊢ p→ q ⇐⇒ p→ q and ⊢ (p→ q) ⇐⇒ p→ q.
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(a). Since ⊢ α → ∇α, we get ⊢ (∇α → ∇β) −→ (α → ∇β) and ⊢ (α → ∇β) −→
∇(α→ ∇β). Finally, ⊢ ∇(α→∇β) −→ (∇α→∇β) by (3∇) and (2∇). 
(b). By (1), ⊢ (p→ q) −→ (p→ q). By (4), p→ q ⊢ (p→ q). Finally,
by (3) and (2), ⊢ (p→ q) −→ (p→ q). 
Corollary 3.18. If Φ is an i-formula, [∇Φ] is the least upper bound of all classes
[(Φ→ !F )→ !F ], where F is a c-formula.
Let us note that (Φ→ !F )→ !F specializes to ¬¬Φ when F = ⊥.
Proof. Let us observe that [Ψ] is an upper bound of all [(Φ → !F ) → !F ] if and only if
⊢ Ψ →
(
(Φ → !F ) → !F
)
for all c-formulas F . By the exponential law, the latter is
equivalent to ⊢ (Φ → !F ) → (Ψ → !F ). Now by 3.17(a) we do have ⊢ (Φ → !F ) →
(∇Φ → !F ) for all c-formulas F . It remains to show that if ⊢ (Φ → !F ) → (Ψ → !F )
for all c-formulas F , then ⊢ Ψ→∇Φ. Indeed, this follows by setting F = ?Φ. 
A variation of 3.18 can be formulated within the meta-logic, similarly to [1; 4.54]:
Corollary 3.19. ⊢ ∇α ⇐⇒ ⟮p⟯ (α→ !p)→ !p.
Of course, if we replace ⇔ by ↔ here, we will get a meaningless expression (i.e., not
a well-typed λ-expression) since the right hand side contains a meta-quantifier. But if
we could do this, then 3.19 would be saying that ∇ is a “Russell–Prawitz modality” in
the terminology of Aczel [4] (see also [13]).
Proof. Since p does not occur in ∇α, to show that ∇α ⊢ ⟮p⟯ (α → !p) → !p, it suffices
to show that ∇α ⊢ (α → !p) → !p (by the generalization meta-rule). This in turn
reduces to deriving ∇α→
(
(α→ !p)→ !p
)
. By the exponential law the latter formula
is equivalent to (α→ !p)→ (∇α→ !p), which was derived in 3.17(a).
Conversely, by the specialization meta-rule, ⟮p⟯ (α → !p) → !p ⊢ (α → !?α) → !?α.
But the latter formula is equivalent to ∇α due to !?. 
3.6. Distributivity properties
The following is a direct consequence of 3.6(b).
Proposition 3.20. ⊢ (p ∧ q) ←→ p ∧q and ⊢ ∇(α ∧ β) ←→ ∇α ∧ ∇β.
Proposition 3.21. The following holds in QHC.
(a) ⊢ (?α ∧ ?β) ←→ ?α ∧ ?β;
(b) ⊢ (?α ∨ ?β) ←→ ?α ∨ ?β;
(c) ⊢ ∃x ?α(x) ←→ ∃x ?α(x);
(d) ⊢ ∇(!p ∧ !q) ←→ !p ∧ !q;
(e) ⊢ ∇(!p→ !q) ←→ !p→ !q;
(f) ⊢ ∇∀x !p(x) ←→ ∀x !p(x).
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It is easy to see that these assertions are equivalent to their special cases for i-formulas
in the image of ! and for c-formulas in the image of ?. Those special cases are in turn
parallel to [1; 5.21 and 5.18].
Proof. (a,d). These follow from 3.20 using ⊢ ?!?α↔ ?α or ⊢ !?!p↔ !p. 
(a,d,b,c,f). Let us check (b). We have ⊢ ?α ∨ ?β ↔ ?(α ∨ β) and ⊢ ?!?(α ∨ β) ↔
?!(?α ∨ ?β). 
(e). “→” follows from (4∇) and (!?). The converse follows from (!?). 
Proposition 3.22. The following holds in QHC.
(a) ⊢ ?(α ∧ β) ←→ ?(∇α ∧ ∇β);
(b) ⊢ ?(α ∨ β) ←→ ?(∇α ∨ ∇β);
(c) ⊢ ?∃xα(x) ←→ ?∃x∇α(x);
(d) ⊢ !(p ∧ q) ←→ !(p ∧q);
(e) ⊢ !∀xα(x) ←→ !∀xα(x).
Applying ! to both sides in (a), (b), (c), and ? to both sides in (d), (e) leads to no loss
of generality, but makes the validities parallel to [1; 5.23 and 5.19] — with the exception
of one “missing validity”, ?(α → β) ←→ ?(∇α → ∇β), which will turn out to be an
independent principle [2; 3.14(a) and 4.11].
Proof. Assertions (a,b,c) follow from (?∧), (?∨) and (?∃) using that ⊢ ?α ↔ ?!?α. As-
sertions (d,e) follow from (!∧) and (!∀) using that ⊢ !p↔ !?!p. 
Proposition 3.23. The following holds in QHC.
(a) ⊢ ?!(?α ∨ ?β) ←→ ?(!?α ∨ !?β);
(b) ⊢ ?!∃x ?α(x) ←→ ?∃x !?α(x);
(c) ⊢ !(?!p→ ?!q) ←→ !?(!p→ !q);
(d) ⊢ !∀x ?!p(x) ←→ !?∀x !p(x).
Proof. (a,b). On applying (?∨) or (?∃) to the right hand side, these reduce to 3.21(b,c).

(c,d). On applying 3.16(a) or (!∀) to the left hand side, these reduce to 3.21(e,f). 
4. Stability and decidability
4.1. Stable and decidable c-formulas
Let us recall that a i-formula Φ is called decidable if ⊢ Φ∨¬Φ, and stable if ⊢ ¬¬Φ→ Φ;
decidable i-formulas are stable (see [1; (8)]). Let us call a c-formula F decidable if
⊢ !F ∨ !¬F , and stable if ⊢ ¬!¬F → !F ; decidable c-formulas are stable (using the
intuitionistic law ·α ∨ β→ ¬β→ α, cf. [1; (7)]). Let us note that by 3.2, ⊢ ¬!¬F → !F
is equivalent to ⊢ ?¬!¬F → F , which by 3.10 is in turn equivalent to ⊢ ?!¬?!¬F → F ,
that is, ⊢ ♦F → F . In words, “if F is provably irrefutable, then it is true”.
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Usually the notions of stability and decidability are considered relatively to a theory
over intuitionistic logic. Instead of doing this we will consider internalizations of stability
and decidability as operators.
Thus we define D,S : 1i → 1i as α 7→ α ∨ ¬α and α 7→ ¬¬α → α respectively; and
D,S : 1c → 1i as p 7→ !p ∨ !¬p and p 7→ ¬!¬p→ !p respectively.
Proposition 4.1. (a) If a c-formula F is stable or decidable, then so is the i-formula
!F . The converse holds for c-formulas F of the form ?Φ.
(b) If an i-formula Φ is stable or decidable, then so is the c-formula ?Φ. The converse
holds for i-formulas Φ of the form !F .
These judgements about the QHC calculus follow from their internalized versions,
which will be proved below:
(a) ⊢ D(p)→ D(!p) and ⊢ S(p)→ S(!p).
Moreover, ⊢ D(?α)↔ D(!?α) and ⊢ S(?α)↔ S(!?α).
(b) ⊢ D(α)→ D(?α) and ⊢ S(α)→ S(?α).
Moreover, ⊢ D(!p)→ D(?!p) and ⊢ S(!p)→ S(?!p).
Proof. (a). The first assertion follows since ⊢ !¬p → ¬!p by 3.9(b). The moreover
assertion follows since ⊢ !¬?α↔ ¬!?α by 3.10 and 3.13. 
(b). By 3.13, ⊢ ¬∇α ↔ ∇¬α. From this and (1∇) or (3∇) it follows that ⊢ D(α) →
D(∇α) and ⊢ S(α)→ S(∇α). Now the first assertion of (b) follows from the moreover
assertion of (a). The moreover assertion of (b) follows from the first assertion of (a). 
Proposition 4.2. (a) C-formulas of the form ¬?Φ are stable.
(b) If Φ is stable, then ?Φ is decidable if and only if Φ is decidable.
(c) If ¬F is stable, then !F is decidable if and only if F is decidable.
We will prove the internalizations: (a) ⊢ S(¬?α);
(b) ⊢ S(α)→
(
D(?α)↔ D(α)
)
;
(c) ⊢ S(¬p)→
(
D(!p)↔ D(p)
)
.
Proof. (a). By the classical double negation law, ⊢ ¬!¬¬?α ↔ ¬!?α and by 3.13, also
⊢ ¬!?α↔ !¬?α. Thus ⊢ ¬!¬(¬?α)→ !(¬?α). 
(b). Assuming α ↔ ¬¬α, and writing β = ¬α, from ⊢ ∇¬β ∨ ¬∇¬β ↔ ¬β ∨ ¬¬β
we get ∇α ∨ ¬∇α ↔ α ∨ ¬α. This shows that ⊢ S(α) →
(
D(∇α) ↔ D(α)
)
, and the
assertion now follows from 4.1(b). 
(c). Clearly, ⊢ D(¬p)↔ (¬!p↔ !¬p), and the assertion follows. 
Proposition 4.3. ⊢ ¬¬Φ↔∇Φ if and only if ?Φ is stable.
We will prove the internalization: ⊢ (¬¬α↔∇α)↔ S(?α).
Proof. ∇α→ ¬¬α is derivable 3.14. The converse implication, ¬¬α→ ∇α, is equivalent
by 3.13 to S(∇α), which by 4.1(b) is in turn equivalent to S(?α). 
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4.2. Semi-stability and semi-decidability
Let us call an i-formula Φ semi-decidable if ⊢ ?D(Φ), and semi-stable if ⊢ ?S(Φ). Sim-
ilarly, we call a c-formula F semi-decidable if ⊢ ?D(F ), and semi-stable if ⊢ ?S(F ).
Here each “?” can be replaced by “∇” due to ⊢ γ⇔ !γ. Stability or decidability im-
plies semi-stability or semi-decidability (both for i-formulas and for c-formulas) due to
γ ⊢ ?γ. Semi-decidability implies semi-stability (both for i-formulas and c-formulas) for
the same reasons that decidability implies stability.
Remark 4.4. Since 4.1 holds in the internalized form, we can apply (?⊤) and (?→) to ob-
tain the literal analogue of 4.1 for semi-stability and semi-decidability, in the internalized
form.
Proposition 4.5. (a) An i-formula Φ is semi-decidable if and only if ⊢ ?¬Φ↔ ¬?Φ.
(b) A c-formula ¬F is stable if and only if ⊢ !¬F ↔ ¬!F .
These hold internally:
(a) ⊢ ?D(α)↔ (?¬α↔ ¬?α);
(b) ⊢ S(¬p)↔ (!¬p↔ ¬!p).
Part (b) is trivial.
Proof of (a). ¬?α → ?¬α is classically equivalent to ⊢ ?α ∨ ?¬α, which is in turn
equivalent to ⊢ ?(α ∨ ¬α). 
Proposition 4.6. (a) A c-formula F is semi-stable if and only if it is stable.
(b) A i-formula Φ is semi-decidable if and only if the c-formula ?Φ is.
These hold internally:
(a) ⊢ ?S(p)⇔ S(p);
(b) ⊢ ?D(?α)↔ ?D(α).
Proof. (a). By (!⊤), ?S(p) ⊢ ∇S(p). On the other hand, by (3∇) and 3.13 we also have
⊢ ∇(¬!¬p→ !p)→ (¬!¬p→ !p), that is, ⊢ ∇S(p)→ S(p). 
(b). Using (?∨) and 3.13, we get ⊢ ?(!?α ∨ !¬?α) ↔ (?α ∨ ?¬α), and using (?∨) again,
we get ⊢ (?α ∨ ?¬α)↔ ?(α ∨ ¬α), as desired. 
Corollary 4.7. ⊢ ∇D(p)→ S(p).
This is a strengthening of “decidability implies stability” for c-formulas.
Proof. Decidability does imply stability: ⊢ D(p) → S(p). Hence ⊢ ∇D(p) → ∇S(p).
On the other hand, by 4.6(a), ⊢ ∇S(p)→ S(p). 
Corollary 4.8. ⊢ ∇(∇α ∨ ¬∇α) −→ (∇α↔ ¬¬α).
This will be used in §5.3 to show that the classical ¬¬-translation of QC into QH
cannot be improved in a certain sense.
Proof. By 4.1(a), ⊢ ∇D(∇α) ↔ ∇D(?α). By 4.7, ⊢ ∇D(?α) → S(?α). By 4.3,
⊢ S(?α)↔ (¬¬α↔∇α). 
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5. Syntactic interpretations
We describe two families of models of QHC which are closely related to the double
negation translation of QC into QH and to the provability translation of QH into QS4,
respectively.
5.1. -interpretation
The classical provability translation of QH in QS4 (see [1; §5.7.3]) extends to the fol-
lowing syntactic -interpretation of QHC in QS4, denoted by A 7→ A:
• Atomic c-formulas and classical connectives remain unchanged;
• Atomic i-formulas are re-typed as atomic c-formulas and are prefixed by ;
• Intuitionistic ∧, ∨ and ∃ become classical, and ×, X are replaced by ⊥, ⊤;
• Intuitionistic → and ∀ become classical and are prefixed by ;
• ? is erased, and ! is replaced by .
Indeed, let us write out the images of the laws and inference rules in 3.8 under the
-interpretation:
(?⊤) α / ?α becomes a /a;
(!⊤) p / !p becomes p /p;
(?!) ·?!p→ p becomes ·p→ p;
(!?) ·α→∇α becomes ·(a→ a);
(!
→
) · !(p→ q)→ (!p→ !q) becomes ·
(
(p→ q)→ (p→ q)
)
;
(?
→
) ·?(α→ β)→ (?α→ ?β) becomes ·(a→ b)→ (a→ b);
(!⊥) · !⊥ → ⊥ becomes ·(⊥ → ⊥).
The resulting formulas are easily derivable in QS4, including the last one, which is the
principle of internal consistency (see [1; §5.7.3]).
The classical laws and inference rules of QHC hold under the -interpretation since
it does nothing to classical connectives and quantifiers and to atomic c-formulas. The
intuitionistic laws and inference rules of QHC hold under the -interpretation since the
restriction of the-interpretation to QH is known to be an interpretation (see [1; §5.7.3]).
Finally, let us note that by an inductive argument based on [1; 5.21], ⊢ Φ ↔ Φ
for any i-formula Φ. It follows that the second-order meta-specialization of the intu-
itionistic type holds under the -interpretation. The other meta-rules hold under the
-interpretation for trivial reasons.
We have proved
Theorem 5.1. If A1, . . . , An ⊢QHC A, then (A1), . . . , (An) ⊢QS4 A.
Of course, by [1; 5.21], all of the intuitionistic connectives and quantifiers (and not
only→ and ∀) could be prefixed by a  in the definition of the -interpretation. Conse-
quently, by [1; 5.23], one could alternatively formulate the -translation as an extension
of Go¨del’s original provability translation: postfix by ’es the intuitionistic ∨, ∃ and→,
erase every !, and replace every ? by a . All atomic subformulas are now kept intact,
and like before, all intuitionistic connectives and quantifiers become classical.
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Theorem 5.2. The QHC calculus is:
(a) a strongly conservative extension of classical predicate calculus QC;
(b) a strongly conservative extension of QS4, via  7→ ?!.
Here a formula of QHC is regarded as a formula of QS4 if it involves only classical
atoms, connectives and quantifiers, as well as the combination  = ?! (but not ? and !
alone).
Strong conservativity in (b) means that if a derivable rule of QHC is expressed in the
language of QS4, then it is derivable in QS4.
Proof. Since the standard interpretation of QS4 in QHC (see 3.2) composed with the
-interpretation is the identity, we get (b). Omitting each  is clearly an interpretation
of QS4 in QC that restricts to the identity on QC. Thus QS4 is a strongly conservative
extension of QC, and we obtain (a). 
5.2. ∇-interpretation
By Theorem 5.2(b), the -interpretation of QHC in QS4 can be regarded as an inter-
pretation of QHC in itself. This does not preserve the types of formulas (i.e., i-formulas
versus c-formulas), but can be amended to do so. This results in the following ∇-
interpretation of QHC in itself, which restricts to an unintended embedding of QH in
QHC:
Theorem 5.3. If A is a formula of QHC, let A∇ be the formula of QHC obtained from
A by prefixing atomic i-formulas and the intuitionistic ∨ and ∃ by !?. Then ⊢ A implies
⊢ A∇, and the converse holds when A is a formula of QH or (trivially) of QS4.
Let us note that the conclusion is only a meta-judgement, that is, it does not claim
that A ⊢ A∇ in QHC, nor the converse when A is a formula of QH. In fact these claims
are false as we will see in [2; Remark 4.9].
Of course, by 3.21(d,e,f) we may redefine the ∇-interpretation A 7→ A∇, without
changing its effect, so as to prefix all intuitionistic connectives and quantifiers of A (not
just ∨ and ∃) and all atomic i-formulas by !?. Alternatively, by 3.22(a,b,c) we might
redefine the ∇-interpretation A 7→ A∇, without changing its effect, so as to prefix the
entire formula A, if it represents a i-formula, by ∇, and postfix every intuitionistic →
and ∀ by ∇’s (atomic subformulas are now kept intact).
Proof. Let A be the -interpretation of A regarded as a formula of QHC, by identifying
 with ?!. Thus A can be obtained from A by first erasing every ? and replacing
every ! by ?!, then prefixing all atomic i-formulas and all intuitionistic connectives and
quantifiers by ?!, and finally retyping all atomic i-formulas as c-formulas and replacing
all intuitionistic connectives and quantifiers by the corresponding classical ones. By 5.2,
⊢ A implies ⊢ A, and the converse holds when A is a formula of QH. Let A
′
 denote
the formula of QHC obtained from A by first erasing every ? and replacing every ! by ?!,
then prefixing all atomic i-formulas and all occurrences of × and X by ? and all other
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intuitionistic connectives and quantifiers by ?!, and finally replacing all intuitionistic
connectives and quantifiers except × and X by the corresponding classical ones. Then
⊢ A′ implies ⊢ A by substituting the !-images of atomic c-formulas for the atomic
i-formulas of A′. The converse implication follows by substituting ?-images of atomic
i-formulas for the atomic c-formulas of A and using ⊢ ?!?α↔ ?α.
On the other hand, as observed above, we may assume A 7→ A∇ to prefix all intuition-
istic connectives and quantifiers of A (not just ∨ and ∃) and all atomic i-formulas by !?.
Let A′∇ denote A∇ if A is a c-formula, and ?A∇ if A is an i-formula. If Φ is an i-formula,
then Φ∇ is an i-formula of the form !?Ψ. In this case, we have Φ∇ ⊢ ?Φ∇ by (?⊤), and
conversely ?Φ∇ ⊢ Φ∇ since ?Ψ ⊢ !?Ψ by (!⊤). Thus ⊢ A∇ ⇔ A
′
∇
for any formula A.
Each judgement of QHC of the form ⊢ A corresponds to a rooted tree whose root
is labelled with ⊢, whose leaves are labelled with the atomic subformulas of A or with
nullary connectives, and whose other vertices are labelled with the unary and binary
connectives and the quantifiers of A. We can draw this tree on the plane so that every
connective or quantifier is drawn above those in the subformulas that it applies to. (Thus
the root is at the top, and the leaves are in the bottom.) Then ?’s and !’s alternate
along every path that is vertical (in the sense that its projection to the vertical axis is
a monotone function). Hence ?’s and !’s partition the tree into intuitionistic fragments,
bounded below by !’s or atomic i-formulas or × or X, and above by a ? or by the ⊢; and
classical fragments, bounded below by ?’s or atomic c-formulas or ⊥ or ⊤, and above by
an ! or by the ⊢.
To analyze the difference between A′ and A
′
∇, we can use the tree of A and write
any prefix added to a connective or quantifier of A on the edge just above the vertex
that it labels, in respective order. Then the difference is confined to the intuitionistic
fragments of the tree of A, and is that A′ has an extra ? (with respect to A
′
∇) just below
each intuitionistic connective and quantifier and a missing ? just above it. Then we may
push the extra ?’s up using (?∧), (?∨) and (?∃) as well as 3.23(c,d), thus obtaining that
⊢ A′ ↔ A
′
∇. (Alternatively, one can push !’s down, using (!∧) and (!∀) as well as 3.16(a)
and 3.23(a,b).) 
5.3. ¬¬-interpretation
The classical ¬¬-translation of QC in QH (see [1; §5.6]) extends to the following syntactic
¬¬-interpretation of QHC in QH, denoted by A 7→ A¬¬:
• Atomic i-formulas and intuitionistic connectives remain unchanged;
• Atomic c-formulas are re-typed as atomic i-formulas and are prefixed by ¬¬;
• Classical ∧, → and ∀ become intuitionistic, and ⊥, ⊤ are replaced by ×, X;
• Classical ∨ and ∃ become intuitionistic and are prefixed by ¬¬;
• ! is erased, and ? is replaced by ¬¬.
Indeed, let us write out the images of the laws and inference rules in 3.8 under the
¬¬-interpretation:
(!⊤) p / !p becomes ¬¬pi /¬¬pi;
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(?⊤) α / ?α becomes α /¬¬α;
(!?) ·α→∇α becomes ·α→ ¬¬α;
(?!) ·?!p→ p becomes ·¬¬¬¬pi→ ¬¬pi;
(!⊥) · !⊥ → ⊥ becomes ·×→×;
(!
→
) · !(p→ q)→ (!p→ !q) becomes · (¬¬pi→ ¬¬ρ)→ (¬¬pi→ ¬¬ρ);
(?
→
) ·?(α→ β)→ (?α→ ?β) becomes ·¬¬(α→ β)→ (¬¬α→ ¬¬β).
The resulting formulas are easily derivable in intuitionistic logic, including the last one
(see [1; §3.14, (44)]).
Intuitionistic laws and inference rules of QHC hold under the ¬¬-interpretation since
it does nothing to intuitionistic connectives and quantifiers and to atomic i-formulas.
Classical laws and inference rules of QHC hold under the ¬¬-interpretation since the
restriction of the ¬¬-interpretation to QC is known to be an interpretation (see [1; §5.6]).
Finally, let us note that by an inductive argument based on [1; 5.18], ⊢ F¬¬ ↔
¬¬F¬¬ for every c-formula F . It follows that the second-order meta-specialization of
the classical type holds under the ¬¬-interpretation. The other meta-rules hold under
the ¬¬-interpretation for trivial reasons.
We have proved
Theorem 5.4. If A1, . . . , An ⊢QHC A, then (A1)¬¬, . . . , (An)¬¬ ⊢QH A¬¬.
Of course, by [1; 5.18], all of the classical connectives and quantifiers (and not only
∨ and ∃) could be prefixed by a ¬¬ in the definition of the ¬¬-interpretation. Con-
sequently, by [1; 5.19] one could formulate the ¬¬-interpretation as an extension of
Kuroda’s translation: prefix by a ¬¬ the entire formula if it is a c-formula, postfix by
¬¬’s every classical ∀, replace every ! by a ¬¬, and erase all ?’s. All atomic subformulas
are now kept intact, and like before, all classical connectives and quantifiers become
intuitionistic.
As in [1], we also get an “essentially local” version of the ¬¬-interpretation:
• postfix by a ¬¬ every ∀ and ∧;
• prefix by a ¬¬ every ∃ and ∨;
• postfix by a ¬¬ every ! that is followed by a ? or by an atomic c-formula;
• prefix by a ¬¬ the entire formula if it is an atomic c-formula or starts with ?;
• erase all ?’s and !’s.
Since the restriction of the ¬¬-interpretation to QH is the identity, we obtain
Theorem 5.5. The QHC calculus is a strongly conservative extension of QH.
5.4. ♦-interpretation
By Theorem 5.5, the ¬¬-interpretation of QHC in QH can be regarded as an interpreta-
tion of QHC in itself which does not preserve the types of formulas. In this sense it can
be improved, so as to preserve the typing. This results in the following ♦-interpretation
of QHC in itself, which restricts to an unintended embedding of QC:
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Theorem 5.6. If A is a formula of QHC, let A♦ be the formula of QHC obtained from
A by prefixing
• classical → and ∀ by ; and
• atomic c-formulas, ?, and classical ∨ and ∃ by ♦,
where  = ?! and ♦ = ¬¬. Then ⊢ A implies ⊢ A♦, and the converse holds when A is
a formula of QC or (trivially) of QH.
The conclusion is to be read as a meta-judgement, that is, it does not claim that
A ⊢ A♦ in QHC, nor the converse when A is a formula of QC. In fact the former claim
is false as we will see in [2; Remark 4.3].
The proof of Theorem 5.6 is similar to that of Theorem 5.3, using additionally di-
agram (∗) below. Let us only note that the combination ♦ arises by applying the
-interpretation (in the prefixing version) to a ¬¬. When this ¬¬ is in front of an
atomic c-formula, that atomic c-formula would have to been prefixed by ♦; but the
last  is easily seen to be redundant.
By starting from different versions of the ¬¬-interpretation, and applying different
versions of the -interpretation, one gets a few equivalent forms of the ♦-translation.
For example, by starting from Kolmogorov’s original form of the ¬¬-translation, we get
the following succinct version of the ♦-interpretation:
• Prefix all classical connectives, all atomic c-formulas, and all ?’s by ♦.
This translation extends Fitting’s translation of classical logic in QS4 [19].
On the other hand, by starting with the “essentially local” form of the ¬¬-interpretation,
and applying the prefix form of the -translation, we get the following version of the
♦-interpretation: Prefix classical → and ∀, and atomic c-formulas by a ; prefix clas-
sical ∨ and ∃ by a ♦; postfix classical ∀ and ∧ by a ♦; prefix by a ♦ every ! that
is followed by a ? or by an atomic c-formula; and if the entire formula is an atomic
c-formula or starts with ?, prefix it by a ♦. Now atomic c-formulas do not really need
to be prefixed by ’es, since they are anyway effectively prefixed by double negations in
the form ♦, which clearly suffices. Next, the prefix ♦ of classical ∨’s and ∃’s can be
reduced to a mere ♦ by the price of postfixing classical→’s, ∨’s and ∃’s by ’es. Finally,
by [1; 5.21(a)], it does not hurt to also prefix classical ∧’s by ’es; and given that, by
[1; 5.23], the postfix ♦ of classical ∀’s and ∧’s can be reduced to a mere ♦.
To summarize, we get the following “essentially local” form of the ♦-interpretation:
• Prefix and postfix every classical → by a ;
• prefix classical ∀’s and ∧’s by ’es, and postfix them by ♦’s;
• prefix classical ∨’s and ∃’s by ♦’s, and postfix them by ’es;
• postfix by a ♦ every ! that is followed by a ? or by an atomic c-formula;
• prefix by a ♦ the entire formula if it is an atomic c-formula or starts with ?.
Using the usual identities, this can be further reformulated in a more economical way
in terms of ! and ?:
• Prefix every classical → by a ? and postfix it by an !;
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• prefix every classical ∀ and ∧ by a ?, and postfix it by ¬!¬;
• prefix every classical ∨ and ∃ by ¬?¬, and postfix it by an !;
• replace every ∇ by a ¬¬;
• replace by ¬!¬ every ! that is followed by an atomic c-formula;
• if the formula starts with ?, replace that ? by ¬?¬;
• if the entire formula is an atomic c-formula, prefix it by a ♦.
This can be regarded as an improved form of Kolmogorov’s original ¬¬-translation,
since it has the effect of expressing all classical connectives and quantifiers in terms of
intuitionistic ones. In particular,
∃xp(x) is translated as ¬?¬∃x!p(x).
In words, there exists an x such that p(x) if and only if one cannot derive a contradiction
from constructing an x and proving p(x).
5.5. Applications to QH4
The ∇-interpretation is easily seen to lift to the interpretation of QH4 in itself described
by Aczel [4]:
QH4
Aczel’s interpretation
−−−−−−−−−−−−→ QH4
∇=!?
y
y∇=!?
QHC
∇-interpretation
−−−−−−−−−→ QHC.
The vertical arrows of this diagram commute with the inclusions of QH into QH4 and
into QHC, so they are faithful on QH (since QHC is a conservative extension of QH). On
the other hand, the ∇-interpretation was shown to be faithful on QH, so we conclude
that Aczel’s interpretation restricts to an unintended embedding of QH into QH4, which
we will call the ∇-translation.
Since ⊢ ∇¬¬α↔ ¬¬α not only in QHC, but also in QH4 (see [4]), we have the
commutative diagram
QC
¬¬-translation
−−−−−−−−→ QH
¬¬-translation
y
yinclusion
QH
∇-translation
−−−−−−−→ QH4.
(∗)
The ¬¬-interpretation of QH4 in QH replaces every occurrence of ∇ by ¬¬. On the
other hand, the ∇-translation of QH into QH4 and the ¬¬-translation of QC into QH
are defined using similar formulas A∇ and A¬¬, which, as discussed above, can both be
written out by prefixing all connectives, quantifiers and atomic subformulas with either
∇ or ¬¬. Hence A∇ and A¬¬ become equivalent upon substituting ∇ by ¬¬, and we
get the following commutative diagram.
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QH
∇-translation
−−−−−−−→ QH4
·α∨¬α
y
y∇=¬¬
QC
¬¬-translation
−−−−−−−−→ QH.
By 4.8, which can in fact be proved in QH4 and not just in QHC (we leave this for
the reader to check), this is a pushout diagram, that is, the ¬¬-translation of QC into
QH does not factor through any logic obtained by adding a set of laws to QH4 that are
collectively strictly weaker than ·∇α↔ ¬¬α. In this sense, the classical ¬¬-translation
of QC into QH cannot be improved.
6. Discussion
6.1. Knowledge-that vs. knowledge-how
Kolmogorov has summarized his philosophical views on intuitionism in his foreword12 to
a 1936 translation of Heyting’s book [29] (translated from Russian):
“We cannot agree with intuitionists when they say that mathematical objects are products
of constructive activity of our spirit. For us, mathematical objects are abstractions of
actually existing forms of reality, which is independent of our spirit. But we know
how essential in mathematics is, in addition to pure proof of theoretical propositions,
constructive solution of posed problems. This second, constructive side of mathematics
does not eclipse for us its first and foremost side: the cognitive one. However, the laws of
mathematical construction, discovered by Brouwer and systematized by Heyting under
the guise of a new intuitionistic logic, keep their fundamental importance for us, in their
present understanding.”
This is quite in line with a passage from Kolmogorov’s 1929 survey [35]:
12Which must have been addressed in part to the Soviet censor, as it included the obligatory denunci-
ation of subjective idealism. This could well have implications for the wording and emphasis chosen,
but hardly for the sincerity of Kolmogorov’s words (as one can judge from his published correspondence
with Alexandrov and from the transcript of Luzin’s trial).
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“We could distinguish two sides in this concept of mathematics. On the one side, there are
theories postulating the existence of infinite systems of objects satisfying certain axioms
and formally deriving from the axioms the properties of the system being studied. On the
other side, construction of the corresponding objects, based either on positive integers or
on some other resource of elementary objects, is also recognized as necessary. Experience
of the last years shows that no stable balance was attained between these two sides. The
standpoints that came to light in recent times may be roughly formulated as follows.
Hilbert proposed to keep only the former, formal part of mathematics, while having set
us free, by means of his theory of consistency, from the necessity to construct. On the
contrary, Brouwer values mainly the constructive part, but thinks that construction is
unable to give us the ultimate existence of infinite collections that is needed for a free
use of the ways of reasoning that have became common to mathematics; and therefore
he demands a radical revision of the methods of a mathematical proof.
The emergence of these extreme viewpoints is explained by the fact that joining of the
two sides of the set-theoretic mathematics has led to great difficulties and even contradic-
tions.” (There follows a discussion of Russell’s paradox, Weyl’s predicativist restrictions,
and non-measurable sets.)
The two sides of mathematics referred to by Kolmogorov can be seen as representing two
modes of knowledge (including formalized mathematical knowledge, but also keeping in
mind subjects such as common knowledge and collective intelligence):
• knowledge-that (or knowledge of truths), and
• knowledge-how (or knowledge of methods).
This dichotomy is also noted, from a slightly different perspective, in [18]:
“In contrast with the structural (platonistic) point of view, intuitionistic mathematics
focuses primarily on the subject (the creative mathematician) and his ability to per-
form certain mathematical operations by applying his previously designed constructions
(knowing how). Hence a notion such as ‘proof’, which refers to the successful completion
of a human action, appears to be more suitable than that of ‘truth’.
On the other hand, classical mathematics focuses essentially on the object: eternal pre-
existing mathematical structures (knowing that); and for this reason, the notion of ‘truth’,
with its prominent descriptive untensed character, is more appropriate.”
There is, however, hardly any connection with the distinction made in philosophy
between “knowledge how” and “knowledge that” — in the tradition originating with G.
Ryle, whose “knowledge how” is an unconscious, non-articulable ability.13 The same can
be said of procedural vs. declarative knowledge of cognitive psychology. Somewhat closer
to our concern here are the distinction between declarative and imperative programming
languages, and another distinction made in philosophy, starting with B. Russell: knowl-
edge of objects (including mathematical objects) “by acquaintance” vs. “by description”.
Hilbert’s distinction between formal mathematics (subject only to freedom from con-
tradiction) and intuitively justifiable, “finitistic” methods (especially as reinterpreted in
13Martin-Lo¨f argued of “knowledge how in Ryle’s terminology” that “the distinction between knowledge
how and knowledge that evaporates on the intuitionistic analysis of the notion of truth.” [42; p. 36].
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[48]) is also to the point. Mathematically most relevant is, of course, Lawvere’s adjunc-
tion between the Formal and the Conceptual.
Our connectives ! and ? amount to two “conversion” operators between the two modes
of knowledge. These give rise to compound types of knowledge:
(1) knowledge-that there-exists a knowledge-how (or knowledge of the possible);
(2) knowledge-how to-acquire the knowledge-that (or knowledge of reasons).
Here knowledge-how to-acquire the knowledge-that some mathematical assertion is true
means, of course, knowledge-how to prove that assertion (cf. [42; pp. 28–29]). In general,
(2) could be dubbed “knowledge-why” or even “understanding”.
Now, (1) occurs most distinctively whenever one applies a non-constructive existence
theorem. For instance, for those who feel at home with ZFC, presumably one is supposed
to have the knowledge-that there-exists a knowledge-how to well-order the reals (with-
out being aware of any specific well-ordering). For those who feel more at home with
constructive mathematics, a more down-to-earth example is provided by constructive
proof-checkers, such as Coq. If you know that Coq works correctly on your computer14
and you acquired a file with a fully Coq-formalized proof of, say, the Four Color The-
orem,15 then by running Coq to certify this proof you would presumably acquire the
knowledge-that there-exists a knowledge-how to color any given planar map in four
colors (without getting any clue how to do the actual coloring).
6.2. Understanding historic writings
6.2.1. Orlov–Heyting interpretation. Go¨del’s provability translation, as well as his sketch
of a proof-relevant S4 that we relied upon in motivating our formulation of QHC (see
§2.4) were anticipated by informal provability interpretations of intuitionistic logic in
the papers by Heyting [26], [27] and, independently, Orlov [43; §§6,7] (see also [15] for a
discussion of Orlov’s work in English). We will now briefly review these papers, which
will also prepare us for a discussion of Kolmogorov’s letter to Heyting [37].
All three papers focus mainly on a pair of operators, which we will denote by + and
∼ throughout, following [26] and [37]. (Orlov [43] writes Φ and X; and in his second
paper [27], Heyting writes + and ¬. For consistency, we will alter these to + and ∼,
respectively, when quoting from these papers.) The meaning of these operators will be
discussed in a moment.
Heyting and Kolmogorov also use the symbol ⊢ to mean something quite different
from both the modern meaning of this symbol and its original meaning as used by Frege
and Russell. According to Heyitng [26]:
14For instance, if you have manually verified the code of its rather small kernel (which in turn verifies all
the needed extensions), and if you believe that one can neglect potential bugs in the operating system
and in the design of the microprocessor, as well as possibilities of malfunctioning due to a manufacturing
defect, heat or irregularities of power supply (or just because of a microscopic meteorite).
15Without any tricks smuggling in the law of excluded middle as in [24]
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“To satisfy the intuitionistic demands, the assertion must be the observation of an em-
pirical fact, that is, of the realization of the expectation expressed by the proposition
p. Here, then, is the Brouwerian assertion of p: It is known how to prove p. We will
denote this by ⊢ p. The words ‘to prove’ must be taken in the sense of ‘to prove by
construction’.”
It is not really clear to the author exactly what this may mean from the viewpoint of
classical meta-logic. But if letters used for unknown propositions (such as p in Heyting’s
words above) are understood as propositional variables (or meta-variables for proposi-
tional variables), then, with an appropriate interpretation of + and ∼ (discussed below),
⊢ may be read in a usual way, as asserting provability in the modal logic S4. With this
in mind, we will follow Heyting et al. in using lowercase letters for propositions in the
present section (in contrast to the notation elsewhere in the present series of papers).
If p is a proposition, both Heyting and Orlov interpret +p as p is provable. Orlov states
unambiguously that + is constrained precisely by what turns out to be the modal axioms
of S4;16 Heyting says only that “A logic that would treat properties of the function +
would [...] be purely hypothetical; [...] one cannot ask [the intuitionistic mathematicians]
to develop this logic” [26].
Heyting interprets ∼ p as “p implies a contradiction” and calls ∼ “the Brouwerian
negation”; whereas Orlov says that it “has the same meaning” as Brouwer’s notion of
“absurdity” of a proposition in [12]. At the same time, Orlov is able to identify ∼ p as
+¬p, where ¬ is the classical negation; in this connection, Heyting only says: “the nega-
tion of a proposition always refers to a proof procedure which leads to the contradiction,
even if the original proposition mentions no proof procedure” [27].
In his second paper [27], Heyting also states:
“[I]ntuitionist logic, insofar as it has been developed up to now without using the function
+, must be understood [... in the sense of] treating only propositions of the form ‘p is
provable’ or, to put it another way, by regarding every intention as having the intention
of a construction for its fulfillment added to it.”
In practical terms this means, in particular, that Brouwer’s theorem on triple absurdity
[12] should be interpreted as ⊢ ∼∼∼+ p ↔ ∼+ p. Thus we consider Heyting’s earlier
claim in [26] that “Mr. Brouwer has proved that∼∼∼ p is identical to ∼ p” to be in error,
as pointed out essentially by Heyting himself. This fully agrees with Orlov’s independent
analysis, which contains valid proofs of ⊢ + p→ ∼∼+ p and ⊢ ∼∼∼+ p↔ ∼+ p and
informal arguments that ⊢ p 6→ ∼∼ p and ⊢ ∼∼∼ p 6→ ∼ p. Orlov also supported these
judgements by an analysis of Brouwer’s writings:
16Orlov’s own system of axioms is weaker than S4 in that it is based not on classical logic, but on a
weaker system now known as relevant logic, which satisfies ⊢ p↔ ¬¬p but neither of ⊢ ¬p→ (p→ q),
⊢ q→ (p→ q), ⊢ p ∨ ¬p (see [15]). Orlov erroneously believed that the use of full classical logic would
trivialize the + operator.
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“Brouwer often resorts to the following method of defining notions: ‘We call a real number
g rational if two whole numbers p and q can be specified so that g = p/q; and irrational
if one can make the assumption of the rationality of g to lead to absurdity.’ [[12]]
Here it is evident that a rational number is defined via provability of the existence of
the two integers, in other words, by a function of the form + a. If the assumption that
the existence of p and q is provable leads to absurdity, then g is irrational. Therefore,
irrationality is defined by means of ∼+ a.”
Nevertheless, Orlov was only partially aware of Heyting’s principle quoted above, for
he interpreted the intuitionistic understanding of the principle of excluded middle as
+ p ∨ ∼ p, rather than + p ∨ ∼+ p.
Apart from these oddities, Heyting’s both papers and Orlov’s paper seem to be com-
patible with each other and with Go¨del’s provability translation. In particular, both
Heyting and Orlov mention the equivalence of ++ p with + p and of +∼ p with ∼ p;
and of the judgements ⊢ + p and ⊢ p. We should mention, however, yet another oddity
found in Heyting’s letter to Freudenthal, where he first gave an interpretation of the
intuitionistic negation (see [46]):
“I believe that also a→ b, like the negation, should refer to a proof procedure: ‘I possess
a construction that derives from every proof of a a proof of b’. In the following, I will
keep to this interpretation. There is therefore no difference between a→ b and +a→ +b.
Note that this is at odds already with Heyting’s own distinction between ∼ a and
∼+a, which he was clear about in [26].
We will thus refer to the standard interpretation of + and ∼, where “propositions”
are formalized as formulas of S4, + is identified with the modality  of S4, and ∼ is
regarded as an abbreviation for ¬. The latter abbreviation is, in fact, very convenient
also from a technical viewpoint, for it gives a more intelligible form to judgements that
correspond to basic properties of a subset of a topological space under the topological
interpretation of S4:
(1) ⊢ +F (or ⊢ F ): Entire space
(2) ⊢ ∼F (or ⊢ ¬F ): Empty set
(3) ⊢ ∼+F (or ⊢ ¬F ): Boundary set (⇔ interior is empty⇔ complement is dense)
(4) ⊢ ∼∼F (or ⊢ ¬¬F ): Dense set (⇔ closure is the entire space)
(5) ⊢ ∼∼+F (or ⊢ ¬¬F ): Complement is nowhere dense (⇔ interior is dense)
(6) ⊢ ∼∼∼F (or ⊢ ¬¬¬F ): Nowhere dense set (⇔ closure is a boundary set)
Note that by Brouwer’s theorem that ⊢ ∼∼∼+F ↔ ∼+F , this list cannot be contin-
ued any further. It is immediate from ⊢ F → F that
• (1) implies (5), which in turn implies (4); and
• (2) implies (6), which in turn implies (3).
Also, it is immediate from the necessitation rule that the following pairs of judgements
are contradictory:
• (6) contradicts (4);
• (4) contradicts (2);
A GALOIS CONNECTION BETWEEN INTUITIONISTIC & CLASSICAL LOGICS. I: SYNTAX 41
• (2) contradicts (1);
• (1) contradicts (3);
• (3) contradicts (5).
Heyting [26] overlooked only the last entry of the list (1)–(6). Accordingly, in his
discussion of possible combinations of these judgements he missed precisely those that
involve (6). His “possible combinations” consist of judgements that neither imply nor
contradict one another. It is easy to check that there are just nine of them: the empty
combination; the six singleton combinations; and two pairs: (3)+(4) and (5)+(6). Of
these, only (1), (2), (3)+(4) and (5)+(6) are “definitive” in Heyting’s terminology, that
is, cannot be extended to a larger combination.
6.2.2. Kolmogorov’s letters to Heyting. The combination (3)+(4) was discussed by Heyt-
ing in detail [26]:
“[L]et us consider the proposition ‘Every even number is a sum of two primes’ (Goldbach’s
conjecture). Then p means simply that in taking an even number at random, one expects
to be able to find two primes of which it is the sum. (This possibility is decided after a
finite number of attempts.) +p on the contrary requires a construction that gives us this
decomposition for all even numbers at once. [...] In order to be able to assert ⊢ ∼+ p,
it suffices to reduce to a contradiction the assumption that one can find a construction
proving p; by that one will not yet have proved that the assumption p itself implies a
contradiction. If we appeal to the example of Goldbach’s conjecture, we find: ⊢ ∼+ p
means that one will never be able to find a rule that effects in advance the decomposition
of all even numbers; this does not mean that there is a contradiction when one supposes
that in taking an even number at random, one will always be able to divide it into
two prime numbers. It is even conceivable that it could one day be proved that this
last supposition cannot lead to a contradiction; then one would have at the same time
⊢ ∼+ p and ⊢ ∼∼ p. One should abandon every hope of ever settling the question; the
problem would be unresolvable.”
Heyting’s second paper [27] contains a virtually identical discussion but with a different
choice of p, namely, the one asserting that a given rational number lies within every
interval with rational endpoints that contains Euler’s constant C.
Heyting’s claims are confirmed rigorously in the standard interpretation, since there
exist dense boundary sets (for instance, Q viewed as a subset of R). This is in contrast
with Kolmogorov’s claims in his first letter to Heyting [37]:
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“1. You consider as an example (in [[26]]) the proposition ‘Every even number is a sum
of two primes’. But it is known that the formula ⊢ ∼∼ p → p is true in this case from
either classical or intuitionistic viewpoint. If one asserts ⊢ ∼∼ p, then automatically
there is ‘a construction, which gives us this decomposition for all even numbers at once’.
Hence ⊢ ∼∼ p→ + p, and the case ⊢ ∼∼ p ∧∼+ p is impossible.
2. It seems to me that the point is not in a defect of this particular example. Each
‘proposition’ in your framework belongs, in my view, to one of two sorts:
(α) p expresses hope [l’esperance] that in prescribed circumstances, a certain exper-
iment will always produce a specified result. (For example, that an attempt to
represent an even number n as a sum of two primes will succeed upon exhausting
all pairs (p, q), p < n, q < n.) Of course, every ‘experiment’ must be realizable
by a finite number of deterministic operations.
(β) p expresses the intention to find a construction.
3. We agree that in the case (β), the difference between p and + p is not essential, but
the proposition ∼∼ p→ p should not be regarded as evident. In the first case (α), on the
contrary, p and + p have distinct meanings, but we have ⊢ ∼∼ p→ p and ⊢ ∼∼ p→ + p.
This is why ⊢ ∼∼ p ∧ ∼+ p is always impossible, both in the case (α) and in the case
(β).
4. I prefer to keep the name proposition (Aussage) only for propositions of type (α) and to
call “propositions” of type (β) simply problems (Aufgaben). Associated to a proposition
p are the problems ∼ p (to derive contradiction from p) and + p (to prove p).”
Kolmogorov insists that every proposition p of type (α) satisfies ⊢ ∼∼ p → + p,
apparently because p comes endowed with a constructive procedure of verification of
the validity of every particular instance of p; from ∼∼ p we infer that this procedure
actually returns a positive result on all inputs; thus it yields a constructive proof of p.
This applies to the example of p cited by Kolmogorov, Every even number is a sum of two
primes, since it can be verified constructively whether a given specific number n is a sum
of two primes (by exhausting all primes < n). The same applies to the other example of
Heyting, and in general to every proposition of the form ∀x1 . . .∀xn q(x1, . . . , xn), where
the validity of q is verifiable by a finite procedure.17
However, already the classical negation ¬p of such a proposition p, for instance, the
proposition There exists an even number that is not a sum of two primes, is presumably
neither of type (α) nor of type (β) — since it does not assert that such a number can be
constructed explicitly. (In contrast, ∼ p must be of type (β), according to Kolmogorov’s
(4).) In his second letter to Heyting, Kolmogorov himself speaks of propositions that
are neither of type (α) nor of type (β):
17These so-called Π0
1
propositions are sometimes claimed to be precisely the propositions accessible to
Hilbert’s finitistic reasoning (see [20; p. 191]).
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“In the meantime, I have thought about your example of the proposition ‘For all i we
have ai < bi’. Let, in general, x be a variable and P (x) a problem depending on x. The
‘hope’ [Hoffnung] to find for each x a solution of the problem P (x) is neither a problem
nor a proposition in my terminology. It would be very interesting to know if with this
hope you associate a positive expectation [Erwartung] that for each x the problem P (x)
will really be solved (by whom and when)? If this expectation is not intended, then I am
afraid that we will arrive at the naive non-intuitionistic understanding of the statement
‘P (x) is solvable for each x’.”
If the ai and bi are assumed to be real numbers (Heyting’s reply to Kolmogorov’s
first letter, which would clarify this matter, is not available; see, however, a fragment of
Heyting’s letter to Becker below) then the proposition ai < bi amounts to an existentially
quantified proposition about rational numbers (or integers). In this case, Kolmogorov’s
statement ‘P (x) is solvable for each x’, where the problem P (x) is instantiated as “Prove
that ax < bx” will be of the form ∀x?!∃y q(x, y), to use the notation of QHC. As observed
by Troelstra [44],
“In the second letter [to Heyting] Kolmogorov observes that the distinction between ‘P (x)
can be solved for each x’ and ‘there is a uniform method for solving P (x) for each x’ is
non-intuitionistic [that is, “does not fit into an intuitionistic point of view”]; the point was
accepted by Heyting, as the fragment of his letter to Becker, reproduced above, shows.”
Here is the relevant part of the said fragment of Heyting’s letter to Becker [44] (translated
from German):
“Another matter is that the application of my logic is restricted to constructive questions.
What I mean by this may be illuminated by the following example. Let two sequences
of real numbers {ai} and {bi} be given. The proposition ‘For each i, ai = bi’ admits two
interpretations.
a) It can mean the problem of finding a general proof that upon the choice of a
particular index i specializes to a proof of ai = bi;
b) one can understand by it the expectation [Erwartung] that if one keeps choosing
an index i arbitrarily, he will succeed in proving ai = bi every time.”
The difference is clear if one applies the negation to a) and b). It is conceivable that
the assumption of a proof as requested in a) could be proved contradictory, without
this contradiction affecting the assumption of b). My logic applies if each proposition
is understood as in a); the logic of the non-constructive expectations b) would be much
more involved; I do not consider its development to be very fruitful.”
6.2.3. Interpreting Kolmogorov’s letters. To summarize our reading of the quoted writ-
ings, Heyting is right in that one can have at the same time ⊢ ∼+ p and ⊢ ∼∼ p; and
Kolmogorov is right in that one cannot have these two at the same time if p is as in any
of Heyting’s two examples, or more generally if p is a proposition either of type (α) or
of type (β).
If we try extract precise definitions from Kolmogorov’s letter, propositions of type
(α) satisfy ⊢ ∼∼ p → + p and presumably no other identities (we assume, following
Heyting, that all propositions satisfy ⊢ + p → p, so Kolmogorov’s ⊢ ∼∼ p → p is
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automatic); whereas propositions of type (β) satisfy ⊢ p → + p and presumably no
other identities. On the standard interpretation of + and ∼, propositions of type (β)
should then correspond to all open sets, and propositions of type (α) to all sets S such
that Int ClS ⊂ IntS. This includes, in particular, all closed sets and all regular open
sets, and no other open sets.
Although this is clearly not what Kolmogorov could have meant regarding the judge-
ment ⊢ ∼+ p ∧ ∼∼ p, which under the standard interpretation of ∼ and + in QS4 is
identified with ⊢ ¬F ∧ ¬¬F , it is worth observing that ·¬p ∧ ¬¬p /× is an
admissible rule for S4 (see [1; Example 5.20]).
Kolmogorov concluded his first letter to Heyting with the proposal of two operators
from propositions of type (α) to problems. The first operator, Prove the given proposi-
tion, resembles the restriction of our operator “ !”, which is defined on all propositions.
The second operator, Derive a contradiction from the given proposition, resembles what
we denote by !¬. (Note, however, that to interpret Kolmogorov’s first operator ∼ as
+¬, one has to extend the domain of his second operator + to the classical negations
of propositions of type (α).) In this setup, Kolmogorov’s propositions of type (α) are
precisely those propositions that satisfy ⊢ ¬!¬p→ !p (note that one of the two negations
is classical and the other one is intuitionistic).
Heyting’s 1932 paper [28] contains an elaboration of some ideas in Kolmogorov’s first
letter, which appears to agree with our conclusions. For each formula F of a logical
calculus that contains classical propositional calculus, Heyting introduces the problem
βF of proving F ; and discusses the significance of the problems ¬βF → β¬F and
¬β¬F → βF .
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